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Note
For My Doctor's Eyes Only:
Ferguson v. City of Charleston
Sandi J. Toll*
"I went to MUSC because I was looking for help, because I had an
illness that I couldn't get rid of by myself. Instead they treated me like
an animal."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC), 2 in
conjunction with state and local law enforcement officials, developed
and implemented the Interagency Policy of Management of Substance
Abuse During Pregnancy ("MUSC's policy"). 3  MUSC's policy
required hospital personnel to obtain urine samples from pregnant
women suspected of drug abuse.4 If a patient tested positive, she would
* J.D. expected May 2002. 1 would like to thank the law journal staff for their guidance and
editorial comments. To my family, especially my parents, sister, and brother, thank you for your
love and encouragement. To my friends, thank you for your continual support. Finally, I would
like to dedicate this article to Harry, for making me believe that anything is possible.
1. Nightline, How Far Can You Go to Protect an Unborn Child? (ABC television broadcast,
Sept. 27, 2000), at http://www.abc.go.com/onair/nightline/transcripts/nI00927_trans.html
(quoting petitioner Patricia R. Williams); see also infra note 245 and accompanying text
(profiling the petitioners who filed suit in Ferguson v. City of Charleston).
2. MUSC is a public hospital in Charleston, South Carolina that receives state and federal
funding. Kimani Paul-Emile, The Charleston Policy: Substance or Abuse, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L.
325, 326 n.l (1999); see also infra note 202 and accompanying text (profiling the race and
socioeconomic status of MUSC's patients).
3. Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 326. MUSC hospital officials and Charleston law enforcement
developed and implemented a policy requiring pregnant women who satisfied one of nine criteria
to take a urine drug test. NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Safeguarding the Rights of
Pregnant Women, at http:/lwww.nowldef.orglhtmllcourts/2000-200 l/Ferguson.shtml (last visited
Aug. 8, 2001). For a detailed discussion of MUSC's policy, see infra notes 201-34 and
accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text (discussing the drug testing requirements
and procedures of MUSC's policy).
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be required to immediately enter a residential drug treatment program or
face arrest and criminal prosecution.
5
Although MUSC established the policy to treat pregnant drug abusers
and their unborn children, the policy punished, rather than helped, the
women who sought prenatal care at MUSC. 6  Thirty women were
arrested under MUSC's policy, even though many of them were still
recovering from delivery. 7 For example, one patient was handcuffed to
her bed during delivery while others were arrested wearing their
hospital gowns and still bleeding from childbirth.8 In 1993, ten of these
women challenged MUSC's policy as a violation of their Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches. 9
When Ferguson v. City of Charleston reached the United States
Supreme Court, the issue became whether MUSC could test pregnant
women, absent a warrant or patient consent, for illegal drug use and
then turn positive test results over to the police.' ° The Court concluded
that the drug tests did not fall within the special needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment's traditional warrant and probable cause
requirements."' Despite the dangers of prenatal drug use, the majority
held that the governmental interest did not justify violating a patient's
constitutional right to privacy. 12  As a result, the drug tests were
unconstitutional searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 13
5. See infra notes 217-26 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of violating
MUSC's policy and explaining treatment options).
6. See Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 326.
7. See infra notes 231, 234 and accompanying text (describing patients who were arrested
pursuant to MUSC's policy).
8. Brief for Petitioners at 17, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-
936).
9. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1286 (2001) [hereinafter Ferguson 111.
The Fourth Amendment states:
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text (providing a more
detailed analysis of the Fourth Amendment).
10. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1284.
11. See infra Part II.B (examining judicial development of the special needs doctrine). The
special needs exception is applicable under circumstances where "the existence of special needs,
beyond the normal needs of law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirements
impractical." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
12. See Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1294; see also infra note 306 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's finding that protecting the health of unborn children did not qualify as a
special need).
13. Ferguson H1, 121 S. Ct. at 1293.
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Because of Ferguson, hospitals can no longer test pregnant patients for
illegal drug use without their consent if positive results are used for
future prosecution. 14
Part II of this Note begins with an overview of the Fourth
Amendment, including a discussion of the special needs exception to its
warrant and probable cause requirements. 15 Part II then summarizes the
history of fetal abuse prosecution and outlines the development and
implementation of MUSC's policy.16 Part III then explores the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson.17 Part III will then argue
that the majority is correct in holding that MUSC's policy does not fall
within the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment, but
questions why the concurring opinion left open the possibility of
allowing fetal abuse prosecutions when a warrant or patient consent is
obtained. 18  Part IV will also argue that the dissenting opinion
incorrectly minimized the use of law enforcement officials to implement
and enforce MUSC's policy.' 9 Part V demonstrates how the Ferguson
decision insures that pregnant drug abusers will continue to access
prenatal care and at the same time protect the health of their unborn
children. 20  This Note concludes, however, by cautioning that the
Ferguson opinion leaves unanswered questions regarding the future of
fetal abuse prosecutions 2 1 and the scope of the special needs doctrine. 22
II. BACKGROUND
Exploring the interwoven nature of constitutional law and the social
interests surrounding government-sponsored drug testing policies is
important to understanding the Ferguson opinion. 23  The Fourth
14. National Coalition for Patient Rights, Supreme Court Limits Drug Tests During
Pregnancy, at http://www.nationalcpr.org/supremecourtlimits42001.htm (last modified Aug. 3,
2001).
15. See infra Part IIA-B (discussing the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the
development of the special needs exception).
16. See infra Part II.C-D (discussing both the societal pressures that led MUSC officials to
develop its drug testing policy and the policy's specific components).
17. See infra Part IH.C.1 (discussing the majority opinion); infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the
concurring opinion); infra Part III.C.3 (discussing the dissenting opinion).
18. See infra Part 1V.A-B (analyzing the majority and concurring opinions).
19. See infra Part 1V.C (questioning the analysis and conclusions reached by the dissent).
20. See infra Part V.A (discussing the positive implications resulting from the Court's
decision).
21. See infra Part V.B (examining the breadth of possibilities that may trigger fetal abuse
prosecutions under the reasoning of the concurrence).
22. See infra Part V.C (discussing the uncertainty that remains in special needs jurisprudence).
23. See infra Part II.A-D (discussing the development of the special needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment and the societal issues that led to the implementation of MUSC's policy).
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Amendment requires all searches and seizures to be reasonable.2 4  The
impracticality of obtaining a warrant in certain situations, however, led
the Supreme Court to develop the special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment's traditional requirements. 25  From a societal perspective,
the Ferguson decision arose from the government's desire to protect
both the health of unborn children and stem the explosion of infants
born addicted to crack cocaine. 26 In response to these concerns, MUSC
and Charleston law enforcement officials developed and implemented
the MUSC policy.27
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by government
officials. 28  An individual's Fourth Amendment rights are only
implicated when a government official has unfairly infringed upon his
or her expectation of privacy. 29 Designed to prevent arbitrary and
unnecessary infiltration into an individual's personal zone of privacy, 30
the Fourth Amendment only applies to searches and seizures conducted
by government agents.
3
'
24. See infra Part II.A (discussing the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment).
25. See infra Part II.B (outlining the development of the special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment).
26. See infra Part II.C (discussing the hostile environment surrounding the rise in prenatal
drug use and crack-addicted infants).
27. See infra Part I1.D (discussing the development of MUSC's drug testing policy).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (discussing
the unreasonable seizures that led to the challenge in MUSC's policy). A search is defined as an
invasion of one's privacy in order to find an illegal product. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984) (holding that a government search was reasonable because the
defendant's property, an open field, was accessible to the public). A person is seized when, given
all of the circumstances surrounding a stop or arrest, a person reasonably believes that he or she is
unable to freely leave the area. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (requiring an
objective determination of an individual's ability to voluntarily leave police custody); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (listing specific factors to determine when an
individual has been seized by a government official).
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that the
Fourth Amendment requires the individual to have an expectation of privacy that is viewed as
reasonable by societal standards).
30. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
31. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (limiting the Fourth Amendment to
actions of the federal government). The Fourth Amendment is applicable to both federal and
state actors. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment's right to privacy is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and is enforceable
against state officials").
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To the trier of fact, the constitutionality of a search or seizure turns
on whether it is (1) reasonable 32 and (2) based on probable cause. 33 In
deciding whether a search is reasonable, the trier of fact must balance
the government's interest in conducting the search against the invasion
of a person's privacy. 34 In addition, the government's conduct must be
based on probable cause, and executed pursuant to a warrant. 35 Taken
together, the Supreme Court determined that searching an individual
without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is per se
unreasonable. 36
However, the principle that all searches must be conducted with
probable cause is not absolute. 37  When the government's interests
outweigh the individual's privacy expectations, government officials
may be allowed to conduct a search without individualized suspicion. 38
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989) (stating that the Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches). The
reasonableness requirement often prevents the government from searching or seizing an
individual without particularized suspicion. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
33. Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (stating that probable cause is
required unless a special need makes the warrant and probable cause requirements futile); see
also Jill Dorancy-Williams, Comment, The Difference Between Mine and Thine: The
Constitutionality of Public Employee Drug Testing, 28 N.M. L. REV. 451, 463 (1998); infra note
35 (describing the probable cause requirement as it relates to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
34. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (noting, however, that certain established
exceptions exist). Probable cause is defined as the level of suspicion necessary to justify a search
that ordinarily would be protected by the Fourth Amendment. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 695 (1996). Probable cause exists when known circumstances would reasonably suggest
that a suspect has evidence of a crime in his or her possession. Seanna M. Beck, Thirtieth Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 89 GEO. L.J. 1055, 1062
(2001). It requires a fair possibility that an illegal item will be found in a specific place or on the
person. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 283 (1983). In order to issue a warrant, a judge must be
satisfied that law enforcement has probable cause to justify the search. See United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
36. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308. The Court reiterated that requiring the search to be reasonable
"generally bars officials from undertaking a search ... absent individualized suspicion." Id.; see
also Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, "Special Needs" in Criminal Justice: An
Evolving Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 3
GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. J.L. 203, 203-04; cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
555-56 (1976) (holding that although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly mention
individualized suspicion, it is generally required for a search or seizure to be found
constitutional). But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (holding that a
search without a warrant is unreasonable unless it fits within a narrowly defined exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement).
37. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (stating that "neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor indeed,
any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in
every circumstance").
38. 2 DAVID O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 802-09 (2d ed. 1995). Other examples of searches that do not require a warrant
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Under circumstances where the government's interests are of great
importance and the individual's privacy expectations are deemed less
significant, the Supreme Court found the strict warrant probable cause
requirements unnecessarily restrictive and began utilizing a
reasonableness standard to evaluate the constitutionality of the search.39
B. Development of the Special Needs Doctrine
The special needs exception stands as one of the most frequently
utilized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements. 40  This exception enables government officials to
randomly search individuals when they have a special need that extends
include searches after an individual has been arrested, cases where the suspect has voluntarily
consented to the search, searches conducted while in pursuit of a suspect, situations where the
search is necessary to prevent an individual from destroying exculpatory evidence, searches at
sea, vehicle searches, border searches, inventory searches, and searches where the special needs
of the state override an individual's privacy interests. Douglas K. Yatter et al., Twenty-Ninth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Warrentless Searches and Seizures, 88 GEO. L.J. 912,
912 (2000).
39. George M. Dery, Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy Than School Children? How
Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment "Special Needs" Balancing, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 76 (1998). For example, searches incident to an arrest or stop and frisk
searches of suspicious individuals do not require government officials to obtain a criminal
warrant based upon probable cause. Yatter, supra note 38, at 912-13; see also New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981) (holding that officers do not need individualized suspicion to
search an arrested suspect for weapons); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)
(finding that preserving evidence validates a search under similar circumstances); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that if a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that an
individual is engaging in criminal activity, the officer may detain the individual, ask questions,
and perform a pat-down for weapons). Similarly, nonconsensual administrative searches for
health and safety purposes do not require the same degree of probable cause because of the
necessity of regular inspections and reduced privacy expectations related to intense government
oversight. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987) (upholding warrantless
administrative searches of regulated industries when the state has a substantial interest in
regulating the industry, the search is required to further that interest, and notice has been given).
In New York v. Burger, the Court held that requiring government officials to obtain a warrant
would reduce the effectiveness of unannounced inspections. Id. at 710. Moreover, the
defendants already had a reduced expectation of privacy because of their involvement in a highly
regulated industry. Id. at 704-07; see also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21
(1978) (finding that satisfaction of "reasonable legislative or administrative standards" fulfills the
probable cause requirement for an administrative search). Finally, if the underlying purpose of
the administrative search is to uncover criminal wrongdoing, the government must obtain a
criminal warrant based upon probable cause. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 (1984). In
Michigan v. Clifford, the fire department suspected that a fire-damaged house was the result of
arson. Id. at 289-91. The Supreme Court held that if the fire department's only purpose was to
determine the cause of the fire, then they did not need to obtain a criminal warrant. Id. at 293-94.
If the underlying purpose of the search was to find evidence of arson, however, a warrant based
on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing was required. Id. at 294.
40. Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the Special Needs
Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REV. 258, 259 (2000); infra note 70 (defining the special needs exception).
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beyond the normal need for law enforcement. 41 When the government
posits a special need, a court can weigh the government's interests
against the individual's right to privacy and determine if the search is
reasonable. 42
In order for a search to fall within the special needs exception, the
government must demonstrate that it has an interest beyond normal law
enforcement goals by presenting clear evidence that the search will
remedy a "real" problem. 43 In addition, the government must show that
the underlying purpose of the search cannot be achieved if the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements are enforced. 44
If these elements are satisfied, the court will then balance the
government's interest in conducting the search against the individual's
privacy interests.4" Only if the court is convinced that the government's
interest outweighs the individual's privacy interest will the warrantless
search or seizure be upheld.46
Special needs determinations are based upon the totality of the
circumstances. 47  Legal scholars have argued, however, that this high
41. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citing Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). "Normal" has been interpreted as searches conducted by
police officers in order to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution. Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note,
"Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant
Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 543 (1997).
42. Bryony J. Gagan, Note, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, South Carolina: "Fetal Abuse,"
Drug Testing, and the Fourth Amendment, 53 STAN. L. REV. 491, 501 (2000).
43. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873. Justice Ginsburg defined a "real" problem as one that is
"important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest and sufficiently
vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion."
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997); see also Yatter, supra note 38, at 982-83. A
"special need" is therefore even greater than the prosecutorial needs of law enforcement. Skinner,
489 U.S. at 619; see also infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (describing the Court's
current approach to what constitutes a "special need").
44. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 533. In this case, the Court found that the
government interest in dispensing with the warrant requirement was based on whether "the
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the government purpose behind the search."
Id.
45. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
46. Id. The degree of intrusion is measured by both objective and subjective standards. Mich.
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990). The objective intrusion is "measured by
the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation." Id. The subjective intrusion is
"measured by the extent to which the method chosen minimizes or enhances fear and surprise on
the part of those searched or detained." Id.
47. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314 (holding that the trier of fact must review the individual facts of
each case when determining the legality of a special needs search); see also United Teachers v.
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 142 F.3d 853, 856-57 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that drug testing
employees injured on the job did not constitute a special need); Knox County Educ. Ass'n v.
Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 373 (6th Cir. 1998) (validating certain school policies
while invalidating others under the special needs exception); Willis v. Anderson Cmty. Sch.
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level of subjectivity clouds the ability of a court to completely assess
the level of the privacy intrusion. 48  Moreover, they contend that the
delineation between special needs and law enforcement searches is
increasingly unclear. 49  Despite these criticisms, courts continue to
uphold the constitutionality of the special needs exception. 50
1. Origin of the Special Needs Exception: The Administrative
Search Doctrine
As the government's interest in conducting warrantless searches rose
in the arena of public health and safety, the administrative search
doctrine developed.5 1 While this doctrine furthered the development of
the special needs exception, 52 the Supreme Court's decision in Camara
v. Municipal Court of City & County of San Francisco laid the actual
foundation for the special needs exception. 53
Corp., 158 F.3d 415, 419 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding a public school's policy of drug testing students
suspended for fighting did not qualify as a special need); Hatley v. Dep't of the Navy, 164 F.3d
602, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that governmental interest in keeping firefighters drug free did
not qualify as a special need under the Fourth Amendment).
48. Vaughn & del Carmen, supra note 36, at 221. The authors argue that the balancing test
has become so generalized that governmental interests will always outweigh an individual's
interest in protecting his or her privacy. Id.; see also Dery, supra note 39, at 74 (concluding that
the Court balances the competing interests of the government and the individual without
consulting any objective standards).
49. Vaughn & del Carmen, supra note 36, at 222.
50. Since its official introduction in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court has continuously
recognized the validity of the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment's traditional
requirements. See, e.g., Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1288-90 (2001); Chandler, 520 U.S. at
318-22; Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-33 (1989); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.
51. Vaughn & del Carmen, supra note 36, at 206. Administrative searches generally consist
of "fire, health, or safety inspections of residential or private commercial property." Yatter, supra
note 38, at 978. Prior to conducting an administrative search, government officials must obtain
an administrative search warrant. Id. This warrant is based on a lower probable cause standard
than criminal investigations. Id. For example, evidence of statutory violation or a reasonable
suspicion that public safety is at risk is enough to establish probable cause. Id. at 978-79.
52. Vaughn & del Carmen, supra note 36, at 206.
53. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Prior to Camara, the Court in Frank
v. Maryland had previously upheld the conviction of a private homeowner prohibiting a
municipal health inspector from entering and inspecting his premises without a search warrant.
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled in part by Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387
U.S. 523 (1967). Similarly, the Camara decision arose out of a property owner's refusal to allow
a warrantless inspection of his residential apartments. Camara, 387 U.S. at 525. Arguing that the
inspection was a significant intrusion upon his privacy interests, the owner asserted that the
inspection constituted an illegal search. Id. at 527. Specifically, Camara asserted that the search
was unconstitutional because it "authorize[d] municipal officials to enter a private dwelling
without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing
Code existed therein." Id.; see also infra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
decision in Camara).
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In Camara, the Court recognized that health and safety concerns may
provide justification for relaxing the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement. 54  The Court distinguished between a
criminal search that must comply with the stringent Fourth Amendment
requirements and an administrative search designed to protect public
health and safety. 55 Recognizing that requiring individualized suspicion
for administrative searches may frustrate the government's purpose in
conducting the search,56 the Court concluded that the reasonableness of
an administrative search must be measured in light of public policy.
57
Camara's main value, however, arises in its departure from the strict
probable cause requirements. 58 In Camara, while probable cause was
still required, the government no longer needed individualized suspicion
when the government's need to conduct an administrative search was
greater than an individual's privacy expectation.5 9 Commentators
argue, however, that this subsequent lack of probable cause enabled the
54. Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in Fourth Amendment
Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 92 (1992).
55. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535. The Court found that unlike criminal searches, "the inspection
programs at issue [were] aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical
standards for private property." Id.
56. Id. at 533. Unlike a search pursuant to a crime, the San Francisco city inspectors were
attempting to minimize conditions that were dangerous to public safety. Id. Despite this need,
however, the Court ultimately refused to depart from the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. Id. at 528 (finding that warrants were necessary for a constitutional search "except
in certain carefully defined classes of cases").
57. Id. at 534-37; see also Nuger, supra note 54, at 92. The Court determined that the
reasonableness of a search was based on "balancing the need to search against the invasion which
the search entails." Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. The inspection was reasonable because of the
public's acceptance of housing code enforcement, the public's interest in negating dangerous
living environments, and the limited invasion of personal privacy. Id. Although the inspectors
lacked individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the searches were reasonable because
enforcement of housing regulations was necessary to promote health and safety interests. Id. at
535-36. A search is reasonable only when it satisfies the probable cause requirement. Id. at 535.
Despite the Court's willingness to depart from strict probable cause requirements, however, the
Court ultimately upheld the owner's conviction of housing code violations. Id. at 540. Under the
specific circumstances of this administrative search, the Court determined that Camara's privacy
expectation outweighed the housing inspectors' need to search his property because there was not
an urgent need to inspect the premises. Id. As such, a warrantless search of Camara's property
was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
58. Jennifer E. Smiley, Note, Rethinking the Special Needs Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug
Testing of High School Students and the Narrowing of the Fourth Amendment Protections, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 811,814-15 (2001).
59. Id.; Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37. Under these circumstances, the Court could now
determine the reasonableness of an investigation by balancing the individual's legitimate privacy
expectation against the government's need to conduct a warrantless search. New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37).
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Court to become increasingly deferential to the government. 60 From
this deference to government interests, a new exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements arose in the
form of the special needs exception.
61
2. Emergence of the Special Needs Exception: New Jersey v. T.L.O.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court recognized a new type of
warrantless search which was similar to administrative searches. 62 For
the first time, the Court recognized that certain government interests are
so "special" that searches may be conducted without adhering to
traditional warrant and probable cause requirements. 63 It was from this
determination that the special needs exception emerged.64
T.L.O. was a freshman at a New Jersey public school when she was
caught smoking by a teacher in violation of school policy.65  After
T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking, the assistant vice-principal
demanded to search her purse, where he discovered a pack of cigarettes
and evidence of drug paraphernalia. Subsequently, the school used the
evidence from the search against T.L.O. in school and delinquency
proceedings. 66 The United States Supreme Court applied the balancing
test and held that requiring public school officials to obtain a warrant
would significantly interfere with the school's interest in maintaining
discipline. 67 Moreover, the school's substantial interest in preserving an
orderly educational environment prevailed because students have a
60. Nuger, supra note 54, at 92. Nuger argued that if the Court determines that the
government's interest is particularly important, it will find a way for the search to comply with
the Fourth Amendment. Id. As a result, the individual's privacy rights are given little weight
when determining if the search is reasonable. Id.
61. Id. at 93.
62. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325.
63. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring); infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Blackmun's concurrence in T.L.O.); see also Dodson, supra note 40, at 262.
64. Smiley, supra note 58, at 815.
65. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
66. Id. Upon searching T.L.O.'s purse, the vice-principal also discovered rolling papers. Id.
Believing that use of rolling papers was associated with marijuana use, he continued his search
and found narcotics, a pipe, empty plastic bags, money, and a list of clients. Id.
67. Id. at 340 (balancing a student's expectation of privacy against the school's needs to
provide a safe environment). The Court found that searching a student will be justified when
"there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated . . . the rules of the school." Id. at 342. However, the Court did recognize that
students have an expectation of privacy despite the school's custodial role. Id. at 338.
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lower expectation of privacy. 68  Thus, the Court held that the
warrantless search of T.L.O.'s purse was constitutional.69
A discussion of the special needs exception, however, only appeared
in Justice Blackmun's concurrence.70  Justice Blackmun postulated that
the Court neglected to make a crucial inquiry before applying the
Camara balancing test because it failed to consider whether there were
"exceptional circumstances"71 that justified a special need for the
search.72 Justice Blackmun believed that the Court should balance the
need for the search against the individual's privacy interests only after a
special need appears. 73 Justice Blackmun concurred because he found a
special need, namely that a school must react promptly to behavior that
threatens students, teachers, or the learning process, justified forgoing
traditional warrant requirements. 74 Once he identified the special need,
Justice Blackmun applied the Camara balancing test and reached the
same result as the majority. 75
3. Broadening the Scope of the Special Needs Exception
Two years later in O'Connor v. Ortega, the Court had its first
opportunity to rely on the special needs doctrine to uphold a warrantless
68. See id. at 341. In his dissent, however, Justice Brennan criticized the plurality for an
"unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally applicable Fourth
Amendment standards." Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although recognizing the
impracticality of requiring a warrant to conduct school searches, Justice Brennan found that the
balancing test was heavily skewed in favor of the government and failed to adequately consider
the individual's privacy interests. Id. at 352, 361-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 347-48.
70. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun found that "[o]nly in those
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirements impractical, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). The three factors
Justice Blackmun articulated are (1) the need is special, (2) the need is beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, (3) that the warrant requirement is impractical. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
71. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun named examples of exceptional
circumstances where requiring a warrant is impractical, including "stop and frisk" searches and
stopping cars attempting to cross national borders. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986)); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). But
cf. Vaughn & del Carmen, supra note 36, at 210-11 (arguing that using these examples
contradicts the requirement that the special need must go beyond traditional law enforcement
interests).
72. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
73. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
75. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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search.76 After placing Dr. Ortega on administrative leave for purported
misconduct, hospital administrators conducted a thorough search of his
office and obtained evidence that was used at Ortega's discharge
hearing. 77  Writing for the four member plurality, Justice O'Connor
found that the search was constitutional and upheld Ortega's
discharge. 78 Balancing an employee's reduced expectation of privacy in
the workplace against the employer's need to:closely monitor employee
conduct, 79 the plurality found that the hospital's actions were
reasonable. 80
More importantly, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion marked the
first application of the special needs doctrine outside of the public
school context. 81  Recognizing that employers have a special need to
investigate workplace violations and access work-related documents,
Justice Scalia noted that the need for "frequent and convenient" access
to an employee's files and office space made it impractical to obtain a
warrant prior to conducting a search.82 Since these searches are
reasonable within the workplace environment, the search of Ortega's
office did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
83
76. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion). In Ortega, officials working
for a state hospital investigated allegations of sexual harassment and inappropriate disciplinary
actions in Dr. Ortega's management of residents. Id. at 712 (plurality opinion).
77. Id. at 713 (plurality opinion). Hospital administrators took cards, a photograph, and a
book of poetry sent to Dr. Ortega by a former resident. Id. (plurality opinion). In order to obtain
damages, Dr. Ortega filed a § 1983 civil lawsuit against the public hospital officials, alleging that
he was deprived of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. Id. at 714
(plurality opinion) (citing the Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights Act).
78. Id. at 721-22 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor focused on the realities of the
workplace environment and the importance of preventing illegal conduct from negatively
affecting daily operations. Id. (plurality opinion).
79. Id. at 722 (plurality opinion). The Court found work-related searches are primarily related
to business matters. Id. (plurality opinion). Under these circumstances, requiring a warrant
would be impractical. Id. (plurality opinion). "[T]he common-sense realization [is] that
government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter." Id. at 722 (plurality opinion) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
80. See id. at 728 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor concluded that "employers most
frequently need to enter the offices and desks of their employees for legitimate work-related
reasons wholly unrelated to illegal conduct." Id. at 721 (plurality opinion). For example, they
may need access to files while an employee is away. Id. at 721-22 (plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). According to Justice Scalia, the government's status as Dr.
Ortega's employer and the "employment-related" nature of the search make the special needs
doctrine applicable to these circumstances. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia concluded that "government searches to retrieve
work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules-searches of the sort that
are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context--do not violate the Fourth
Amendment." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The Court subsequently broadened the scope of the special needs
doctrine in Griffin v. Wisconsin.84  Griffin marks the first time that a
majority of the Court relied upon the special needs doctrine to
determine the reasonableness of a search.85 In Griffin, law enforcement
officials searched a probationer's home for illegal firearms without a
warrant or individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. 86 In a 5-4 decision,
the Court utilized the special needs exception to affirm Griffin's
conviction and conclude that the search was reasonable.
87
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that Wisconsin's ability
to maintain its probation system presented a "special need" beyond law
enforcement. 88  Justice Scalia then determined that the search was
reasonable because the state's interest outweighed Griffin's expectation
of privacy. 89 First, requiring a warrant to search a probationer's house
would interfere with the state's ability to respond to alleged wrongdoing
and reduce the deterrent effect of unannounced searches. 9° Second, a
search conducted by a probation officer is less invasive than one
conducted by a police officer, especially because a probation officer's
underlying goal is to help, not prosecute, the probationer.91 Finally,
Justice Scalia argued that a probationer has a decreased expectation of
84. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
85. See Dodson, supra note 40, at 264; see also infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text
(discussing the majority's use of the special needs doctrine to uphold the constitutionality of a
government search).
86. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871. Believing there were guns in Griffin's apartment, probation
officers searched his home and found a handgun. Id. Government officials searched Griffin's
house pursuant to a Wisconsin law that allowed probation officers to search probationers' homes
without a warrant as long there was a reasonable suspicion of contraband inside the home. Id. at
870-71. Since it was illegal for convicted felons to possess firearms, Griffin received a two-year
prison sentence. Id. at 872; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.29(2)(a) (West 1996 & West 2000) (stating
that individuals convicted of a felony in Wisconsin are guilty of a Class E felony if they possess a
firearm). Griffin subsequently challenged his conviction on the ground that the search violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872.
87. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873.
88. Id. at 875. The majority argued that Wisconsin's special need to supervise probationers to
insure safe communities justified the warrantless search. Id. Scalia subsequently compared the
operation of the probation system to the operation of a school, government office, or a prison in
their need for government supervision of students, employees, or prisoners. Id. at 873-74.
89. Id. at 876.
90. Id. The majority concluded that the inevitable delay in obtaining a warrant would hinder
the probation officers' ability to quickly react to probation violations. Id. To demonstrate his
argument, Scalia suggested that "one might contemplate how parental custodial authority would
be impaired by requiring judicial approval for search of a minor child's room." Id.
91. Dodson, supra note 40, at 265 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876-77).
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privacy based on his prior conviction. 92  As the state's interest
outweighed Griffin's privacy interest, the Court determined that the
search was reasonable.
93
Although Griffin and Ortega marked the first time that members of
the Court specifically relied on the special needs exception to decide the
reasonableness of a warrantless search, the decisions still conformed to
traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. 94 Individualized suspicion
remained a required component of all searches, yet played a more
restrictive role than under the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.9
5
It was not until the seminal cases of the late 1980s that the Court
dispensed with the individualized suspicion requirement and allowed
random searches to be considered reasonable under the special needs
exception.
96
4. Individualized Suspicion is Gone: Using the Special Needs
Exception to Justify Mandatory Drug Testing
Eventually, the special needs exception expanded beyond school and
property searches in the companion cases of Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association97 and National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab.98 In both cases, the Court found that the government's
purpose for the search was a special need allowing the Court to dispense
with the Fourth Amendment requirements and apply the reasonableness
balancing test.99 More importantly, these cases outlined the specific
elements of the special needs doctrine and the conditions that
92. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480) (finding that
"probationers do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only...
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions"').
93. Id. at 873.
94. Id.; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 732 (1987) (Scalia, J. concurring); see also supra
notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's use of the special needs doctrine
in his concurring opinion); supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's
use of the special needs doctrine to uphold the constitutionality of a government search).
95. Dodson, supra note 40, at 265. Dodson notes that the Wisconsin regulation in Griffin
"specifically required that there be 'reasonable grounds' for the search." Id. (citing Griffin, 483
U.S. at 871).
96. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)).
97. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
98. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656.
99. Robert S. Logan, Note, The Reverse Equal Protection Analysis: A New Methodology For
"Special Needs" Cases, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447, 454-55 (2000); Michael Polloway,
Comment, Does the Fourth Amendment Prohibit Suspicionless Searches-Or Do Individual
Rights Succumb to the Government's "So-Called" Special Needs?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
143, 155 (1999). Polloway argues that these decisions "eviscerat[ed] the explicit warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Polloway, supra.
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government officials must satisfy in order to conduct a warrantless
search. 00
Skinner involved Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations
that required mandatory blood and urine samples from employees
involved in train accidents. 10 1 After determining that collecting and
testing bodily fluid samples constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment, 10 2 the Court applied the special needs doctrine to
determine if the FRA must obtain a warrant before testing its
employees. 10 3  First, the Court concluded that insuring the safety of
railroad passengers qualified as a special need beyond normal law
enforcement."°  Second, to require railroad employers to obtain a
warrant before collecting and analyzing employee samples was
100. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-67.
101. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602. The FRA developed these regulations pursuant to the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), which authorized the Secretary of Transportation to
"prescribe, as necessary, appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of
railroad safety." Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (repealed 1994). The
sections of the FRSA pertaining to drug testing were subparts C and D. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609.
Subpart C required all railroad employees directly involved in train accidents that caused (i) a
fatality, (ii) the release of hazardous materials, or (iii) property damage greater than $500,000 to
provide urine and blood samples for drug testing. Id. Section D authorizes, but does not require,
employers to conduct drug tests following an accident and in conjunction with an employer's
suspicion of drug or alcohol abuse. Id. at 611. Employees could also be tested if an employer
had reasonable suspicion of abuse following a speeding incident or violation of other regulations.
Id.
The regulations were passed by the FRA in response to several train accidents that resulted
from drug and alcohol use. Id. at 606-08. The Railway Labor Executives' Association (the
"Railway") brought suit against Skinner, the Secretary of Transportation, claiming that the
regulations violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 612. Specifically, Railway argued that the
regulations mandated testing even though there was no individualized suspicion of drug or
alcohol abuse. Id. at 609, 612.
102. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17. As an initial matter, Justice Kennedy addressed whether
collecting urine samples constituted a search that would be subject to Fourth Amendment
protections. Id.; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966) (finding that a "compell[ing]
intrusion[] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content" constituted a Fourth
Amendment search). Although a urinalysis did not require an intrusion into the individual's
body, the Court recognized that chemical analysis of bodily samples can reveal extremely
personal information. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. Specifically, "there are few activities in our
society more personal or private than the passing of urine ... it is a function traditionally
performed without public observation ... [and] its performance in public is generally prohibited
by law as well as social custom." Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170,
175 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). As such, the Court determined that collecting
and testing bodily samples constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 617.
103. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-33.
104. Id. at 620-21. The Court noted that the FRA only mandated the tests "to prevent
accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from impairment of employees by
alcohol or drugs." Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.19(a) (1987)). They were not an attempt to
criminally prosecute employees. Id. at 620.
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impractical and unnecessary.10 5  The Court explained that the time
required to obtain a warrant could allow the body to eliminate traces of
drugs and alcohol from the bloodstream. 0 6 Moreover, the regulations
already defined the limited situations where an employee can be
tested. 107
Moving to the balancing test, the Court determined that the
government's interest in protecting the safety of railroad passengers and
the general public from train accidents substantially outweighed the
employees' privacy interest. 10 8 The Court found it significant that the
railroad industry was already subject to a higher degree of scrutiny than
other industries. 1°9 Because the regulations were designed to be as
minimally intrusive as possible, 0 the test results were only released to
the employee's supervisor,"' and the employees were never subject to
criminal prosecution, 112 the Court upheld the FRA's regulations and
concluded that the warrantless searches were reasonable. 1
3
On the same day, the Court in Von Raab determined that the United
States Customs Service ("Customs Service")" 4 could require
mandatory drug tests for agents who carried firearms, handled classified
materials, or were involved in drug interdiction."15 Writing for the
105. Id. at 623.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 622 n.6.
108. Id. at 624. The Court found that requiring individualized suspicion where the privacy
interests implicated were minimal was a heavy burden. Id. Moreover, it found that "where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a
requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such
suspicion." Id.
109. Id. at 627. With respect to railroad employees, the Court noted that "the expectations of
privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is
regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and
fitness of covered employees." Id.
110. Id. at 625-26.
111. See id. at 611,623-24.
112. See id. at 623.
113. Id. at 633-34.
114. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1989). The U.S.
Customs Services is "responsible for processing persons, carriers, cargo, and mail into the United
States, collecting revenue from imports, and enforcing customs and related laws." Id. at 659.
One of its primary functions is drug enforcement. Id. at 660.
115. Id. at 660-63. Customs agents who tested positive for narcotics without a reasonable
explanation were subject to dismissal. Id. at 663. However, the test results could not be used for
criminal prosecution. Id. The Commissioner of Customs implemented the drug-testing program
because of the increased possibility that Customs agents could engage in illegal drug use. Id. at
660. During the course of their employment, Customs employees will likely interact with
individuals who participate in narcotics distribution. Id. Given that drug enforcement had
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majority, Justice Kennedy opined that the Customs Service had a
special need, beyond normal law enforcement, to test its employees for
drug use. 116 Specifically, the Customs Service had a dual purpose: (1)
to deter drug use among employees eligible for positions involving
increased levels of contact with illegal narcotics and (2) to prevent drug
users from ascending to those positions. 117 As in Skinner, the Court
found that a warrant was unnecessary given that the scope and
procedures of the test were clearly defined, limiting possible abuses of
discretion. 18
Applying the balancing test, the Court again determined that the
Customs Service's interest outweighed the employee's privacy
expectations.119 Given the safety concerns and the sensitive nature of a
customs agent's work, the Customs Service had a substantial interest in
ensuring that its employees remained drug-free. 120 Conversely, the
Court found that the agents had a lower privacy expectation because all
employees who requested a promotion to a "covered" position were
aware that they must submit to a drug test.121 In light of the Customs
Service's interest in drug detection, the Court concluded that the testing
program did not require individualized suspicion of drug use and was
therefore constitutional. 1 22
Although both cases were factually similar and analyzed according to
the same doctrine, a greater number of justices voted with the majority
in Skinner than in Von Raab.123 According to Justice Scalia, who joined
the majority in Skinner but dissented in Von Raab, the existence of an
become the agency's primary responsibility, the Commissioner argued that the Customs Service
could not tolerate individuals who violated criminal drug laws. Id.
116. Id. at 666.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 661-63, 667. Under the policy's drug testing procedures, a customs employee was
only tested if he fell within one of the pre-determined employment categories. Id. at 660-61. The
policy also clearly outlined a specific testing protocol, who had access to the test results, and test
confirmation procedures. Id. at 662-63.
119. Id. at 677.
120. Id. at 674. The Court argued that "[tihe Customs Service is our Nation's first line of
defense against one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population."
Id. at 668. The government's interest in protecting its citizens from drug use would be
compromised if the agents themselves were addicted to illegal narcotics. Id. at 670.
121. Id. at 667. Additionally, the "operational realities" of working for the Customs Service
contributed to the decreased expectation of privacy. Id. at 671-72.
122. Id. at 677.
123. Logan, supra note 99, at 455. Skinner was a 7-2 decision while Von Raab was decided
by a 5-4 margin. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 605 (1989); Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 658.
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identifiable drug problem differentiated the two cases. 124 He noted that
while the government in Skinner demonstrated that multiple train
accidents resulted from employee drug and alcohol abuse, the Customs
Service provided no evidence that drug abuse hindered the agency's
effectiveness. 125 Justice Scalia argued that in order to utilize the special
needs exception, the government must prove that the search was
addressing a real, and not hypothetical, harm.1 26
Ultimately, Skinner and Von Raab were significant because the Court
utilized the special needs exception to justify random searches of
individuals without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. 127 The
Court would ultimately expand the special needs exception to include a
wider number of situations where the government's interest in public
safety outweighed an individual's right to privacy. 128 Despite Justice
Scalia's dissent, the Court also appeared willing to apply the special
needs exception based on perceived state interests that were not
supported by evidence. 129
5. Special Needs in Schools: Vernonia
Six years passed before the Court would consider another special
needs case. 130  During this period, however, local, state, and federal
agencies attempted to increase the number of occupations where drug
testing was mandatory. 131 For example, government officials attempted
to implement randomized drug testing for federal prison guards, 132
124. Logan, supra note 99, at 465 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
125. See Von Raab, at 681-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that this was the
dispositive factor in his decision to join the dissent. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). He noted that the
Agency failed to demonstrate that any of the hypothesized incidents such as taking bribes from
drug dealers, illegally utilizing classified information, or carelessly firing a weapon had actually
occurred. Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Most damaging was that out of 3,600 drug tests, only
five agents tested positive. Id. at 683-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Gagan, supra note 42, at 503.
128. Dodson, supra note 40, at 268; Smiley, supra note 58, at 820. Smiley argued that the
Skinner and Von Raab decisions "opened the door" for government officials to require drug tests
in both governmental and non-governmental jobs. Smiley, supra note 58, at 820.
129. The reasoning in Justice Scalia's dissent would eventually be used in Chandler to find
Georgia's drug testing law unconstitutional. See John B. Wefing, Employer Drug Testing:
Disparate Judicial and Legislative Responses, 63 ALB. L. REv. 799, 804 (2000).
130. Vernonia School District v. Acton was decided in 1995. Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
131. Dodson, supra note 40, at 268.
132. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Roberts, 9 F.3d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding
drug testing of federal prison guards).
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airline employees, 33 and hazardous waste workers. 3 4  Although
numerous challenges were made, lower courts overwhelmingly upheld
work-related drug testing programs as a special need exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements.' 
35
In Vernonia School District v. Acton, however, the Court chose a
public school district to revisit the special needs doctrine and uphold the
constitutionality of a warrantless search. 136 Responding to a perceived
increase in the number of student athletes using drugs, 137 the Vernonia
School District implemented a random urinalysis drug-testing program
that applied to every adolescent interested in participating in after-
school sports. 138  In a 6-3 decision, the Court sided with the Vernonia
133. Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 457 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding FAA regulation
requiring drug testing of airline employees).
134. Plane v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (upholding drug
testing of hazardous waste workers).
135. See, e.g., Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 880 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding required drug
test of resident doctor not based on individualized suspicion or a drug-testing program); Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Dep't of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1309 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding drug testing of
commercial truck drivers); Tanks v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 930 F.2d 475, 481
(6th Cir. 1991) (upholding drug testing of GCRTA employees after an accident); Taylor v.
O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1201 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that drug testing of corrections officers
was constitutional); Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113, 115 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that drug
testing of pipefitter at chemical weapons plant was constitutional); English v. Talladega County
Bd. of Educ., 938 F. Supp. 775, 783 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (upholding drug testing of school bus
mechanic); Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 891 F. Supp. 993, 1002 (D. Del. 1995) (upholding
random drug tests of firefighters), vacated on other grounds, 139 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 1998);
Laverpool v. New York City Transit Auth., 835 F. Supp. 1440, 1456 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (upholding
the drug testing of all employees that could affect public safety); Bailey v. City of Baytown, 781
F. Supp. 1210, 1216 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (upholding drug testing of employee who drove a motor
vehicle for the city); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1503
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (upholding drug testing of Veterans Affairs employees in some safety-sensitive
positions); Kemp v. Claiborne County Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (S.D. Miss. 1991)
(upholding drug testing of hospital employee); Holloman v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit
Auth., 741 F. Supp. 677, 687 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (finding that drug testing of city bus drivers was
constitutional), affd, 930 F.2d 918 (6th Cir. 1991); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 739 F.
Supp. 814, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation for random drug
testing or drug testing with suspicion for some Transit Authority employees); Moxley v. Regional
Transit Servs., 722 F. Supp. 977, 982 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that drug testing of bus drivers
was constitutional); Brown v. City of Detroit, 715 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(upholding random drug testing of police officers).
136. Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995).
137. Id. at 648-50. The Vernonia School District had initially attempted to curb the alleged
drug use through preventative measures such as drug awareness classes, speakers, and
demonstrations. Id. at 649.
138. Id. at 650. Students who wanted to play a high school sport had to provide their consent
and obtain their parents' consent. Id. Every student who made the team was required to submit
to a urine test prior to the start of the season. Id. Additionally, ten percent of all student athletes
were randomly tested each week. Id. Although a positive test may result in dismissal from the
team, a student would not be subject to criminal prosecution. See id. Petitioner James Acton, a
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School District and upheld the drug-testing program. 139  Relying on
T.L.O., Justice Scalia concluded that special needs exist in public
schools, particularly when school officials attempt to eliminate drug use
among the student body. 14° Moreover, the need to maintain a suitable
academic environment while quickly responding to disciplinary
problems prevents school officials from obtaining a warrant prior to
conducting a search.141
Upon balancing the school's interest against the students' expectation
of privacy, Justice Scalia specifically focused on the overall nature of
student athletics. 142  Because of the inherent risks associated with
adolescent drug abuse and the "role model" status of athletes at school
and in the community, the Court found that the school district's interest
in preventing drug use substantially outweighed the slight invasion into
a student's privacy.143 Accordingly, the Court determined that the drug-
testing program fell within the special needs exception and was
therefore constitutional. 144
The Vernonia decision expanded the scope of the special needs
exception beyond drug testing in the workplace. 145  However, it also
marked the point when members of the Court began to question the
breadth of the exception. 146 Although Justice Ginsburg concurred with
the majority, she expressed concern over the lack of clear boundaries to
rein in the special needs exception by explicitly noting the narrowness
of the holding.' 47 In the dissent, three justices strongly believed that the
seventh grader who wanted to play football, refused to consent to the drug test and was prohibited
from playing. Id. at 651. He subsequently challenged the law and claimed it violated his Fourth
Amendment right to privacy. Id. at 651-52.
139. Id. at 647.
140. Id. at 653.
141. Id. "'Strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based upon probable cause'
would undercut the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order
in schools." Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)).
142. Id. at 657. Justice Scalia initially determined that student athletes had a lower
expectation of privacy because they played together, showered together, and dressed in the same
locker rooms. Id.
143. Id. at 661-62.
144. Id. at 665. It is important to note that this opinion only focused on high school athletes.
Utilizing Justice Scalia's dissent from Von Raab, the school district only provided specific
evidence of drug use at the high school level. Based on the decision, however, this information
was enough for the Court to uphold a district-wide policy. Dodson, supra note 40, at 269.
145. Dodson, supra note 40, at 269.
146. Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
147. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg noted that based on the evidence
presented, the Court's decision only applied to randomly testing students who wanted to
participate in high school sports. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Dodson, supra note 40,
at 270.
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exception was threatening to completely encompass the Fourth
Amendment's traditional warrant and probable cause requirements. 148
6. Putting on the Brakes: Chandler
Two years later, the Court addressed the concerns voiced by the
Vernonia dissent and struck down a Georgia law requiring candidates
running for state office to submit to a urine drug test. 149 This decision
marked the first instance where the Court failed to uphold a search in
which the government felt the special needs exception applied. 150
Moreover, the term "special needs" became a new judicial standard as
the Court no longer simply accepted the government's assurances
without substantial evidence.151
Moving away from past precedent, the Court voted 8-1 to strike down
the Georgia law and thus created a new standard for what constitutes a
special need. 152 Under the Court's new analysis, a special need became
more than just a label for a state's goal beyond normal law enforcement;
it was now a "substantial" need that was important enough to
significantly outweigh an individual's right to privacy.153 Based on this
new definition, the Court found that Georgia's drug testing program
148. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissent argued
that random testing should only be used when "it has been clear that a suspicion-based regime
would be ineffectual." Id. at 668 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Finally, she criticized the district's
decision to only test athletes, noting that the policy appeared to be "driven more by a belief in
what would pass constitutional muster ... than by a belief in what was required to meet the
District's principal disciplinary concern." Id. at 685 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23 (1997). Prior to initiating their campaigns,
Georgia required candidates running for certain state positions to verify that they had taken a drug
test and that the results were negative. Id. at 309-10. The petitioners argued that the law
constituted a suspicionless search and challenged its constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 310.
150. Id. at 322-23. Prior to Chandler, "when governmental needs beyond those of ordinary
law enforcement are involved, the Court has 'not hesitated to balance the governmental and
privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the
particular context.'" Keleigh Biggins, Note, Candidates for Public Office Exempt from Drug
Testing-Supreme Court Rules There is No Special Need Justifying a Departure from Fourth
Amendment Requirements, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 781, 786-87 (1999) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)). By reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme
Court of the United States had "finally found a drug testing program it didn't like." Marcia
Coyle, Was This Term Historic? Maybe, Say Some, But None of its Big Rulings Was Seen as a
True Landmark, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B5.
151. Joy L. Ames, Note, Chandler v. Miller: Redefining "Special Needs" for Suspicionless
Drug Testing Under the Fourth Amendment, 31 AKRON L. REV. 273, 289 (1997).
152. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313. Although the special needs doctrine was firmly established,
the balancing test was never applied because the majority created a new definition for the word
"special." See id. at 318; see also Ames, supra note 151, at 289.
153. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
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failed to meet the required standard. 154  Although Georgia legislators
argued that preventing drug use by public officials qualified as a special
need, 155 the Court determined that the State failed to provide any
evidence that the law was enacted in response to this problem. 156
The majority also developed more rigorous guidelines regarding the
reasonableness balancing test. 157 Even if Georgia had a special need
that justified dispensing with individualized suspicion, the Court would
not apply the balancing test unless the law was responding to a public
safety crisis. 158 In the present case, Georgia was unable to show that
drug use among potential candidates posed a legitimate threat to public
safety. 159 As a result, the Court held that Georgia's drug testing
program violated the Fourth Amendment and was thus
unconstitutional. 160
7. Criticism of the Special Needs Exception
After Chandler, the Court transformed the special needs exception
from a broad method of searching individuals without probable cause
into a narrower exception that only applied under limited
circumstances. 161 The Court shaped the doctrine into a more objective
test that focused on three identifiable factors to justify a suspicionless
drug-testing program. 162  First, the state must have real evidence that
drug use is a substantial problem justifying a warrantless search. 163
154. Id. at318-19.
155. Id. at 318. Georgia enacted the law to prevent drug users from holding public office. Id.
Lawmakers claimed that drug use impaired a public official's ability to carry out her
responsibilities, especially regarding anti-drug enforcement efforts. Id. Moreover, the public's
ability to trust an elected official would diminish and questions would arise regarding the
character and integrity of all public officers. Id.
156. Id. at 318-19. Relying on Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab and the Court's reasoning
in Vernonia, Justice Ginsburg explained why Georgia's "need" did not justify a departure from
traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. Id. Ginsburg stated that, "[niotably lacking in [the]
respondents' presentation is any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from the
Fourth Amendment's main rule." Id.
157. See id. at 323.
158. Id. The Court derived the "public safety" criteria from its holdings in Von Raab, Skinner,
and Vernonia. See also Dodson, supra note 40, at 271 (noting that Court identified public safety
as the common theme among the three cases).
159. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
160. Id. at 309. The Court concluded that "Georgia's requirement that candidates for state
office pass a drug test, we hold, does not fit within the closely guarded category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches." Id.
161. Ames, supra note 151, at 291.
162. Id. (stating that the Chandler decision "deserves praise for bolstering the objectivity of
the 'special needs' doctrine by setting out more precise requirements").
163. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318-19.
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Second, the testing program must be aimed at detecting actual drug use,
not just deterrence. 164 Finally, public safety must be at risk to justify
dispensing with the traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. 1
65
Although this change appeared to protect individuals from
unnecessary warrantless searches, harsh criticism of this new approach
followed the Chandler decision. 166 Rather than clarify the special needs
doctrine, opponents argued that the decision only served to create more
confusion. 167  The opponents criticized the Court for both failing to
define what constitutes a special need and for failing to provide clear
guidelines for administering the balancing test.
168
Furthermore, opponents noted that equating the special needs
exception with a threat to public safety diminished the exception
because many laws were enacted to promote public safety. 169  Finally,
critics complained that the Court's efforts to outline the exception's
requirements failed because the question of whether a search fell under
the exception required a subjective determination. 170  This lack of
direction, critics argued, allowed judges to adjudicate cases according to
their own priorities and beliefs, and not based on constitutional
164. Id. Justice Ginsburg argued that the government failed to provide "any indication of a
concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule." Id. at 319.
165. Id. at 323; see also Dodson, supra note 40, at 271 (noting that the Court identified public
safety as the common theme among previous special needs cases).
166. See infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text (outlining the criticisms of the Court's
new approach to the special needs exception).
167. Ross H. Parr, Note, Suspicionless Drug Testing and Chandler v. Miller: Is the Supreme
Court Making the Right Decisions?, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 241, 261 (1998). The author
argued that the Court's analysis in the previous three special needs cases would have found
Georgia's drug testing program to be constitutional. Id. As a result, the lower courts will have to
adjust their interpretation of the special needs exception without knowing which interpretation of
the exception to apply. Id. at 262.
168. Dodson, supra note 40, at 274. Dodson notes that "[n]othing in the Court's [special
needs] balancing test provides anything concrete by which to measure state interest and compare
that interest with individual privacy interests. What the balancing test amounts to is how the
Justices feel about a particular law." Id.
169. See id. at 271. Arguing that laws designed to protect the public safety are generally not
categorized as "special," the author notes that "many laws have no utility other than the fact that
they promote public safety" such as traffic laws and criminal regulations. Id. Furthermore,
equating the special needs exception with public safety may allow government officials to invoke
a wide variety of laws that mandate random searches under the guise that they are protecting
individual citizens. Id. at 274.
170. Dorancy-Williams, supra note 33, at 480 (arguing that determining the constitutionality
of drug testing programs is especially difficult given the lack of clear guidelines).
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standards.' 7 1  Despite these objections, however, Chandler represents
the Court's current approach to the special needs exception. 172
C. Fetal Abuse Prosecution
Marking a return to the special needs exception after a three year
absence, the Ferguson opinion arose in an entirely new context from the
previous special needs decisions: testing hospital patients for illegal
drug use. To understand why government officials believed that courts
would expand the special needs doctrine to encompass MUSC's policy,
it is first necessary to analyze why MUSC developed its drug testing
policy, as well as the underlying legal precedent that supported the
hospital's interest in preventing maternal drug use. Ultimately, the rise
in crack cocaine use, media portrayals of pregnant crack addicts, and the
health risks of prenatal drug exposure led to the policy's
implementation. 173 Critics argue, however, that punitive measures will
not promote the health interests associated with pregnant mothers and
their unborn children. 1
74
1. Pregnant Crack Addicts
MUSC developed and implemented its policy during a time when
legislatures were focusing on the relationship between maternal drug
abuse and the explosion of crack cocaine use. 175 Since crack cocaine
particularly appealed to women, 176 and most crack-addicted women are
generally of childbearing age, the late 1980s saw a tremendous increase
in the number of newborns testing positive for drugs. 177  The media
171. See Smiley, supra note 58, at 825-26.
172. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's new approach to
the special needs exception).
173. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons MUSC developed
its policy).
174. See infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness of laws
designed to punish pregnant drug users).
175. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY 155 (1997). When the policy was
first considered in the late 1980s, the United States was unsuccessfully battling the crack cocaine
epidemic. See id. at 154. In 1986 alone, Newsweek and Time each ran five cover stories on the
crack crisis. Id. at 155; see also Richard M. Smith, The Plague Among Us, NEWSWEEK, June 16,
1986, at 15.
176. Diane Alters, Women and Crack Equal Addiction, Unequal Care, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
1, 1989, at 1, available at 1989 WL 4834699.
177. ROBERTS, supra note 175, at 155. The public became aware of this problem after the
National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education (NAPARE) published a
study that estimated more than 375,000 babies were born addicted each year. See Douglas
Besharov, Crack Babies: The Worst Threat is Mom Herself, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1989, at BI,
available at 1989 WL 2040363.
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began to publicize these findings, which allowed politicians to focus
their response on a new group-pregnant crack addicts. 1
78
Specifically, the media portrayed pregnant crack addicts as
irresponsible mothers who subordinated their unborn child's needs in
order to further their addiction. 179  Racial stereotypes also emerged to
further diminish the image of African-American women in society
because the media reported that the majority of addicted mothers were
African-American. 180  Utilizing this characterization, politicians warned
that addicted mothers were producing a new class of individuals:
African-American children addicted to drugs who would become
completely dependent on welfare benefits to survive. 181
2. Punishing Maternal Drug Use
The media's portrayal of pregnant crack addicts, combined with the
perceived dangers associated with drug exposure, led legislators to
implement several punitive measures to deter maternal drug use.
182
Despite research at the time that suggested the effects of prenatal drug
exposure were short-term and treatable, 183 a common response was to
take temporary or permanent custody of the baby at the moment of
178. Gagan, supra note 42, at 496.
179. SHEIGLA MURPHY & MARSHA ROSENBAUM, PREGNANT WOMEN ON DRUGS 11 (1999).
180. ROBERTS, supra note 175, at 157 (arguing that "the pregnant crack addict was the latest
embodiment of the bad Black mother").
181. See Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v.
Wade, 62 ALB. L. REv. 999, 1016-17 (1999).
182. MURPHY & ROSENBAUM, supra note 179, at 11. The response to this crisis was to
embrace a mandate of "zero-tolerance" and impose increasingly severe penalties on individuals
convicted of possession and distribution of illegal narcotics. Paltrow, supra note 181, at 1015.
However, this policy has resulted in more than sixty percent of federally incarcerated individuals
and twenty-two percent of state incarcerated individuals serving time for drug-related offenses.
See Timothy Egan, Hard Time: Less Crime, More Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, § 4, at 1.
Egan notes that:
Americans do not use more drugs, on average, than people in other nations; but the
United States, virtually alone among Western democracies, has chosen a path of
incarceration for drug offenders. More than 400,000 people are [in] for drug
crimes ... nearly a third of them are locked up for simply possessing an illicit drug.
Id.
183. See Paltrow, supra note 181, at 1018. The author argues that while studies confirm that
cocaine use has negative effects on unborn children, other research shows that the impact of
maternal drug use on prenatal development has been greatly exaggerated. Id. Studies have also
shown that receiving prenatal care and maintaining a healthy diet while pregnant may minimize
the effects of maternal drug use. See Scott MacGregor et al., Cocaine Abuse During Pregnancy:
Correlation Between Prenatal Care and Perinatal Outcome, 74 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
882, 885 (1989). Moreover, research suggests that the fetus is more likely to suffer from prenatal
exposure to alcohol and tobacco than crack cocaine. Paltrow, supra note 181, at 1019.
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birth. 184 A second response was the "protective" incarceration of
pregnant crack addicts charged with unrelated offenses. 185  Judges
would sentence pregnant women to jail terms for misdemeanor
offenses, thus enabling the babies to be born in jail and protected from
the mother's addiction. 1
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Finally, prosecutors began criminally charging pregnant women for
their drug use. 187  Although no state adopted a law that criminalized
maternal drug abuse, prosecutors attempted to expand existing laws by
charging women with criminal child endangerment. 188  Other
jurisdictions charged pregnant drug users with knowingly distributing
narcotics to a minor, assault with a deadly weapon, and even
manslaughter or murder. 189
3. Problems with Policing Pregnancy
Opponents of fetal abuse prosecution vigorously argued that laws
designed to punish women who use drugs during pregnancy are
ineffective and ultimately jeopardize the health of both the mother and
her unborn child. 19° The opponents initially argued that the threat of
184. See Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problem of
Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 520-21 (1992).
185. ROBERTS, supra note 175, at 161.
186. Id. Roberts references a Florida case where the defendant was a pregnant addict who
pleaded guilty to forging checks. Id. In sentencing the defendant to jail for the length of her
pregnancy, the sentencing judge stated, "I'm going to keep her locked up until the baby is
born .... She's apparently an addictive personality, and I'll be darned if I'm going to have a baby
born that way." Id.
187. Paltrow, supra note 181, at 1008.
188. See ROBERTS, supra note 175, at 162. In State v. Johnson, a Florida judge handed down
America's first conviction of a mother for prenatal drug use. Id.; State v. Johnson, No. E89-890-
CFA, slip op. at I (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). Charged with
delivering a controlled substance to a minor, the defendant received one year of residential drug
treatment, fourteen years of probation, and continual monitoring of her activities. ROBERTS,
supra note 175, at 164. Three years later, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court
decisions and held that prenatal drug exposure did not constitute delivery of a controlled
substance to a minor. Johnson, 602 So. 2d 1288.
189. See Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Women for Their Behavior During Pregnancy: An
Approach that Undermines the Health of Women and Children, in DRUG ADDICTION RESEARCH
AND THE HEALTH OF WOMEN 467-501 (Cora Lee Wetherington & Adele B. Roman eds., 1998);
see also LAURA E. GOMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS 50-59, 75-91 (1997) (discussing other
legislative attempts to deal with pregnant drug addicts).
190. American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Policing Pregnancy: Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, at http://www.aclu.org/features/f1O0300a.html (last modified July 24, 2001)
[hereinafter ACLU Freedom Network]; see also ROBERTS, supra note 175, at 190. Roberts notes
that this undermines the stated intent of prosecuting pregnant mothers for drug abuse. ROBERTS,
supra note 175, at 190. "[O]verwhelming evidence shows that prosecuting addicted mothers will
not achieve the government's asserted goal of healthier pregnancies. Indeed, the prosecutions
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prosecution significantly deterred women from seeking prenatal care.1
91
Studies indicated that the fear of going to jail and losing their children
overwhelmingly kept pregnant women out of hospitals. 192  As a result,
both pregnant women and their unborn children suffered from a lack of
prenatal and postnatal care.1
9 3
Additionally, imprisoning pregnant women also prevented them from
entering drug-treatment programs. 194 Critics of programs such as
MUSC's policy argued that comprehensive drug treatment is necessary
to help women overcome their addictions, as well as address the
underlying issues that led to their initial drug use.' 95 Moreover, critics
argued that these policies prosecute women whose only crime is an
addiction to illegal narcotics; something that many have long
recognized as a disease requiring treatment, not incarceration. 196
Finally, medical practitioners argued that prosecuting pregnant
women undermined the integrity of the doctor-patient privilege.
197
Doctors argued that they were required to relinquish their roles as
caregivers to become an extension of law enforcement. 198 This breach
will have just the opposite effect .... The threat of criminal sanctions based on this reporting has
already driven some pregnant drug users away from treatment and prenatal care." Id.
191. ROBERTS, supra note 175, at 192. Roberts quotes the U.S. General Accounting Office in
its report to a Senate Committee investigating drug treatment for pregnant women which
concluded that "[t]he threat of prosecution poses yet another barrier to treatment for pregnant
women and mothers with young children." Id.
192. See id. Studies of urban health care centers indicated that a pregnant women's response
ranges from distrust to choosing to deliver their babies at home in order to avoid prosecution. See
also Brief for Petitioners at 17, Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
193. See Brief for Petitioners at 17, Ferguson II (No. 99-936).
194. Mohammad N. Akhter, APHA Applauds Supreme Court Decision to Protect Rights of
Pregnant Women and Preserve Doctor-Patient Relationship, American Public Health
Association, at http://apha.org/news/press/2001/Ferguson-rls.htm (Mar. 21, 2000). Dr. Akhter
argued that putting women in jail does not help the mother or the newborn child. Id. "In jail, a
woman does not get treatment to help her beat her addiction, but what she does get is continued
access to drugs, repeated exposure to violent behavior and inadequate prenatal care." Id.
195. See Brief of Amici Curiae NARAL Foundation et al. at 9-10, Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct.
1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
196. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al. at 8, Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct.
1281 (2001) (No. 99-936) (stating that drug use is a disease).
197. See American Medical Association, Report of the Board of Trustees on Legal
Interventions During Pregnancy: Court Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for
Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666 (1990) [hereinafter
AMA Report]. The American Medical Association was concerned that "a physician's knowledge
of substance abuse ... could result in a jail sentence rather than proper medical treatment." Id. at
2667.
198. See Brief of Amici Curiae The Rutherford Institute et al. at 18, Ferguson I1, 121 S. Ct.
1281 (2001) (No. 99-936). Although disclosures are permitted when required by law, such as
reporting gun shots or knife wounds, these exceptions do not apply to reporting maternal drug
abuse. Id. at 15-16.
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of confidentiality compromised the doctor's ability to provide effective
care because patients were less likely to divulge sensitive information if
they felt threatened. 199 Thus, in light of these reasons, opponents
contend that incarcerating pregnant drug abusers is both ineffective and
dangerous to both the unborn child and the mother's health. 2°
D. MUSC's Policy
MUSC developed and implemented its policy under an umbrella of
societal pressure to curb prenatal drug abuse and limit the number of
infants addicted to crack cocaine.20 1 MUSC is a state-operated facility
that predominantly serves minorities of low socioeconomic status. 20 2 In
April 1989, after concerns about an apparent increase in the number of
patients using crack cocaine while pregnant, MUSC ordered drug tests
of women suspected of using crack cocaine. 20 3  If a patient tested
positive, she was referred for counseling and treatment. 204
In August of 1989, however, MUSC nurse Shirley Brown believed
that the number of pregnant women using cocaine had grown to
epidemic proportions. 20 5 Brown initially discussed her concerns with
MUSC's general counsel, who subsequently contacted then South
Carolina Solicitor Charles Condon about the problem.20 6  Condon
quickly convened meetings with MUSC staff, the Charleston police
department, child welfare services, and the Charleston County
Substance Abuse Commission to address the issue. 207
199. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1997). The Court stated that "the mere
possibility of disclosure [of patients' confidences] may impede development of the...
relationship necessary for successful treatment." Id. at 10.
200. See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness of laws
designed to punish pregnant drug users).
201. Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 331-33; supra notes 175-89 and accompanying text
(discussing the history of the prenatal drug abuse problem, the public reaction, and efforts to
combat the problem).
202. Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 349-50. MUSC provided most of the publicly-funded care
to indigent Charleston residents. Id. Seventy percent of MUSC's patients were African-
American, a disproportionate number as Charleston's overall population was only thirty percent
African-American. Id. at 350.
203. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1284.
204. Id.
205. Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 331. Brown became interested in the issue after hearing a
report about the use of South Carolina's child abuse laws to arrest a women who used drugs while
pregnant. Id.
206. Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct. at 1284.
207. Barry Siegel, In the Name of the Children: Get Treatment or Go to Jail, One South
Carolina Hospital Tells Drug-Abusing Pregnant Women, L.A. TIMES MAG., Aug. 7, 1994, at 14,
available at 1994 WL 2332673. Condon stated that one of the purposes of the meeting was to
"develop a policy as to possible prosecution." Id.
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The task force's underlying goal was to encourage pregnant drug
addicts to obtain treatment.20 8  To achieve this goal, the task force
members agreed to test certain pregnant patients for drugs and to report
positive screens to both the police department and Condon.
209
Specifically, they developed a protocol for providing prenatal care to
pregnant women at MUSC. 210 First, MUSC required a pregnant woman
seeking prenatal care to provide written consent to comprehensive
medical treatment, including a urinalysis. 211  MUSC only performed
urinalysis drug screens, however, on patients exhibiting one of nine pre-
established indicators of illegal drug use. 2 12 Most importantly, hospital
officials did not obtain a search warrant prior to performing the drug
screens or before giving positive test results to law enforcement.
213
Though MUSC officials implemented the policy on October 1, 1989,
they waited eleven days before formally adopting it.214  During the
initial months of implementation, law enforcement officials
immediately arrested patients if they or their newborn children tested
positive for drugs. 215  These women were not offered drug treatment
programs nor were they provided with the option of entering a drug
rehabilitation program to avoid arrest. 21
6
MUSC revised its policy in 1990 to provide women who tested
positive for drug use with treatment options. 217  If a patient tested
positive, the policy required her to attend a film presentation outlining
the dangers of drug use to her unborn child and sign a formal statement
208. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1281
(2001 ) [hereinafter Ferguson 1].
209. Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 332. Critics of the proposed tests derided Condon's law
enforcement goals and felt that medical and treatment options were overwhelmed by the
prosecutorial nature of the program. Gagan, supra note 42, at 497.
210. Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 332. The protocol would later become MUSC's official
policy. However, the protocol did not apply to private patients. Id.
211. Id. at 332-33.
212. Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1285 (2001). The nine indicators were: no prenatal care,
late prenatal care after the second trimester, incomplete prenatal care, abruptio placentae,
intrauterine fetal death, pre-term labor of no obvious cause, intrauterine growth retardation,
previously known drug or alcohol abuse, and unexplained congenital abnormalities. Id. at 1285
n.4. Under South Carolina law, illegal drugs included heroin, crack/cocaine, amphetamines, and
any other narcotic that threatened the life or development of the fetus. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-
370 (West 1985 & West Supp. 2000); Philip H. Jos et al., The Charleston Policy on Cocaine Use
During Pregnancy: A Cautionary Tale, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 120, 121 (1995).
213. Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d at 486; Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 364.
214. Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 334.
215. Brief for Petitioners at 5-6, Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
216. Id.
217. ACLU Freedom Network, supra note 190; Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 371.
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indicating she understood the risk of continuing to use drugs while
pregnant. 218 The patient was also required to complete a series of
appointments at MUSC's obstetrics clinic. 219  Finally, the patient
received a written statement from Solicitor Condon's office, which
indicated the patient had been offered rehabilitative services. 220  The
written statement also emphasized that the patient would be subject to
arrest if she failed to attend treatment sessions and obtain prenatal
care.
22 1
A second positive test resulted in the patient's arrest immediately
following her discharge from the hospital.222 The Charleston Police
Department did not need an arrest warrant prior to taking the patient
into custody. 223 Similarly, if the child tested positive for drugs at birth,
the Department of Social Services took custody of the child.224 An
incarcerated patient, however, could avoid prosecution by successfully
completing an in-patient treatment program. 225 Upon completion of the
program, the charges were subsequently dismissed.226
218. Jos, supra note 212, at 121.
219. Id.
220. Id. The relevant text of Condon's letter reads,
[i]f you fail to complete substance abuse counselling [sic], fail to cooperate with the
Department of Social Services in the placement of your child and services to protect
that child, or if you fail to maintain clean urine specimens during your substance abuse
rehabilitation, you will be arrested by the police and prosecuted by the Office of the
Solicitor.
Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REV. 938, 942-43 (1997)
(quoting Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of their Partial Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 16, Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, No. 2:83-2624-2 (D. S.C. Oct. 1995)). However, throughout the policy's
duration, MUSC officials failed to provide childcare or transportation for women obligated to
participate in drug treatment. Gagan, supra note 42, at 498.
221. Jos, supra note 212, at 121.
222. Id. If the fetus was at twenty-seven weeks or less, the patient was charged with
possession of an illegal substance. Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 333-34; see S.C. CODE ANN. §
44-53-370 (West 1985 & West Supp. 2000) (stating that possession of cocaine is a felony
carrying a maximum five-year sentence). If the fetus was at least twenty-eight weeks old, the
patient was charged with distribution of an illegal substance to a minor. Paul-Emile, supra note
2, at 334; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440 (West 1985 & West Supp. 2000) (stating that
illegal narcotics to a minor carries a sentence of twenty years).
223. Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 333.
224. Id. The patient was subsequently charged with unlawful neglect of a child. Id.; see
generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (West 1985 & West Supp. 2000) (defining what constitutes
unlawful neglect of a child).
225. Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d 469, 474-75 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001).
226. Id.
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Although MUSC's initial goal was "'to ensure the appropriate
management of patients abusing illegal drugs during pregnancy,"' 227
opponents condemned the policy and argued that it was designed to help
Condon prosecute women for harming their unborn children. 228 First,
MUSC was the only hospital in the Charleston area where law
enforcement officials arrested patients who tested positive for drug
use.229  Second, the policy did not provide any second chances for
women who tested positive a second time or gave birth to an addicted
baby. 230 Finally, the overtly prosecutorial nature of the policy appeared
to dominate any efforts to treat and rehabilitate women who tested
positive for drugs.231
In 1994, five years after the policy was implemented, MUSC
officially ended the program. 232  MUSC terminated the policy in
response to the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services investigation of possible civil rights
227. Gagan, supra note 42, at 498 (quoting Jos, supra note 212, at 120).
228. See id. Condon justified his decision to prosecute pregnant drug users because he
believed that the definitions of "child" and "person" under South Carolina law included viable
fetuses. See Rick Bragg, Defender of God, South, and Unborn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at 10.
Condon's interpretation was adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Whitner v. State.
Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998) (finding that
ingesting cocaine during the third trimester constitutes criminal child neglect). However, every
other jurisdiction to consider the issue has generally concluded that "child" does not encompass a
"viable fetus." See, e.g., State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 342 n.13 (Fla. 1997); Wisconsin ex rel.
Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Wis. 1997). For additional discussion of failed
attempts to prosecute women who give birth to drug addicted babies, see Michelle D. Wilkins,
Comment, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive and
Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1404-18 (1990).
229. Brief for Petitioners at 11, Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
230. Gagan, supra note 42, at 498. Instead, these women were immediately arrested. Id.
231. Id. The collaboration of Solicitor Condon, the Charleston police department, and
medical personnel, combined with the possibility of arrest, led opponents of the policy to draw
this conclusion. See id. Moreover, the personal stories of the women arrested pursuant to the
policy also cast doubt as to whether the goal of the policy was to help addicted women and
children. See Brief for Petitioners at 7, Ferguson II (No. 99-936).
For example, Petitioner Lori Griffin was eight months pregnant when she tested positive for
drugs. Id. She was immediately arrested for distribution of cocaine to a minor, handcuffed, and
sent to prison for three weeks. Id. Although she was given prenatal care, she was transported to
the hospital in handcuffs and shackled to the bed during examinations. Id. Petitioner Sandra
Powell was tested when she arrived at MUSC in labor. Id. at 8. After giving birth, Powell was
told that she tested positive for cocaine, charged with unlawful neglect of a child, and
immediately arrested. Id. She was handcuffed and transported to jail wearing only a hospital
gown and still bleeding from childbirth. Id. At no point was she offered drug counseling or
treatment. Id.
232. Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 329.
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violations of its African-American patients. 233 MUSC's policy
ultimately resulted in thirty arrests.
234
III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson was the culmination of
ten women fighting to protect their Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches. The United States District Court for South
Carolina, as well as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, initially
rejected their claims.235  After successfully petitioning the Court for
certiorari, however, their final appeal led to a 6-3 decision against
MUSC and the City of Charleston. 236  The decision was accompanied
by Justice Kennedy's reluctant concurrence 237 and Justice Scalia's
strong dissent.
238
A. Facts
In June 1991, MUSC tested Crystal Ferguson for drugs during a
prenatal physical examination at MUSC without her knowledge or
233. Id. The National Institutes of Health also placed the hospital on probation because its
research on tracking the results of the policy violated federal law prohibiting experimentation on
humans. The Lindesmith Center-Drug Policy Foundation, U.S. Supreme Court Agrees That
Searching and Arresting Pregnant Women at Hospital Violates United States Constitution (Mar.
21, 2001), at http://www.drugpolicy.org/lindesmith/news/pr-march2l-0l.html. It is also
noteworthy that the prosecution of pregnant women predominantly focused on African-American
women of low socioeconomic status. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1436
(1991). Despite research that demonstrates substance abuse is prevalent across all ethnic, race,
and income barriers, African-American women are overwhelmingly the focus of punitive
responses to prenatal drug abuse. ROBERTS, supra note 175, at 172-83. As such, they are
disproportionately reported to service organizations and increasingly subject to arrest. Dwight L.
Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the Prosecution of Drug-
Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 737, 741-43 (1991); Paltrow, supra note 181, at 1023.
234. Brief for Petitioners at 13, Ferguson II (No. 99-936). It is also noteworthy that twenty-
nine of the thirty women arrested were African-American. Id. The petitioners argued that this
disparity implies that low-income African-American women were singled out for prosecution. Id.
at 12. This was confirmed by the appellate court which found that these percentages were
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d
469, 481 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001). Moreover, the policy only affected
MUSC's public Medicaid clinic, which was overwhelmingly utilized by indigent African-
American women, and not its private obstetric clinic. Gagan, supra note 42, at 499-500.
235. Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1286 (2001). The district court's decision is unpublished.
236. Id. at 1293; see infra notes 283-307 and accompanying text (discussing the majority
opinion).
237. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1293-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see infra notes 308-22and
accompanying text (discussing the concurring opinion).
238. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1296-1302 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see infra notes 323-48 and
accompanying text (discussing the dissenting opinion).
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consent. 239  When the test results came back positive for cocaine,
hospital personnel confronted her with MUSC's policy. 24° Ferguson
subsequently entered substance abuse counseling for her addiction.
241
Two months later, after delivering her child at MUSC, hospital officials
again tested Ferguson's urine without her knowledge and found
evidence of cocaine use.242  Because it was her second offense,
Ferguson could only avoid prosecution by immediately entering a
residential treatment program. 243 After her request to attend outpatient
counseling was rejected, police officers immediately arrested Ferguson
for failing to comply with her treatment obligations.
244
B. The Lower Court Decisions
In an attempt to challenge the MUSC policy, Crystal Ferguson and
nine other women, all but one of whom were arrested after testing
positive, filed a lawsuit in the federal district court in South Carolina. 245
Four of the women were immediately arrested pursuant to the 1989
version of MUSC's policy. 246 The other five women were arrested after
the policy was modified in 1990 for either failing to attend drug
treatment or testing positive for a second time.247
The women alleged that MUSC's policy violated their Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, as
well as their constitutional right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 248  In response to the Fourth
239. Ferguson I, 186 F.3d at 485 (Blake, J., dissenting).
240. Gagan, supra note 42, at 491.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. Ferguson refused in-patient treatment because she was unable to find long-term care
for her older children.
244. Id. at 491-92; Ferguson !, 186 F.3d at 485 (Blake, J., dissenting).
245. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1286 (2001). The plaintiffs were Crystal M. Ferguson,
Theresa Joseph, Darlene M. Nicholson, Paula S. Hale, Ellen L. Knight, Patricia R. Williams, Lori
Griffin, Pamela Pear, Sandra Powell, and Laverne Singleton. Brief for Petitioners at i, Ferguson
1/, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936). Darlene M. Nicholson was the only petitioner who was
not arrested pursuant to MUSC's policy. Id. at 10. Upon giving birth, she was required to
immediately enter an in-patient drug treatment program, where she remained until her insurance
expired. Id. The complaint named as defendants the City of Charleston, South Carolina, the
Chief of the Charleston Police Department, former Solicitor Condon, current Solicitor David
Schwacke, Nurse Shirley Brown, and several other MUSC medical personnel involved in prenatal
and obstetrical care. Ferguson I, 186 F.3d at 474 n.1.
246. Ferguson H, 121 S. Ct. at 1286.
247. Id.
248. Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d at 475. The Due Process Clause's guarantee of liberty includes the
right to bodily integrity. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). While this right is not
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Amendment claim, the defendants asserted that, as a matter of fact, the
women had consented to the urine tests. 249 Furthermore, as a matter of
law, the defendants claimed that the searches were reasonable because
they came within the special needs exception. 250
The United States District Court of South Carolina rejected the
defendant's contention that the searches did not qualify for the special
needs exception because MUSC did not use the test results to provide
prenatal care, but rather for prosecutorial purposes. 251  The factual
question of consent, however, was submitted to the jury.252  After
determining that the women had given valid consent for the urine
screen, the jury found that MUSC's policy did not violate the plaintiffs'
rights. 253  Accordingly, the district court entered judgment for the
defendants and upheld the constitutionality of the searches. 254
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding on appeal and
on July 13, 1999 determined that MUSC's policy did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 255  Disagreeing with the District Court, however,
the Fourth Circuit held that MUSC's policy of testing pregnant women
absolute, the Court recognizes reproductive decisions as unique. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
The petitioners also claimed the policy discriminated against African-American women and
that MUSC personnel committed the state-law tort of abuse of process by arbitrarily
administering drug screens. Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d at 475. Regarding the racial discrimination
claim, the plaintiffs' charged that MUSC's policy had a disparate impact on African-American
women in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 475-76.
249. Ferguson H1, 121 S. Ct. at 1286. The defendants claimed that consent was given because
the plaintiffs consented to the drug screens and "freely and voluntarily" sought medical treatment.
Brief for Respondents at 38, Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936). The defendants
also claimed that the plaintiff's gave consent by signing a treatment form authorizing MUSC to
conduct all necessary tests including drug screens. Id.
250. Ferguson H1, 121 S. Ct. at 1286. Because the defendants' claimed that the searches were
reasonable under the special needs exception, whether the plaintiffs' consented to the drug tests
was irrelevant.
251. Id. at 1286-87; Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d at 477 n.7. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants as a matter of law on the privacy and abuse of process claims. The
court then made a finding of fact and ruled in favor of the defendants on the race-discrimination
claims. Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d at 475-76.
252. Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct. at 1286. The judge instructed the jury to render a verdict in favor
of the defendants if they found that the patients had consented to the drug screens. Id.
253. Id. The jury found that by signing MUSC's forms and consenting to medical treatment,
the plaintiffs had waived their right to privacy. Gagan, supra note 42, at 506.
254. Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. at 1287.
255. Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d at 479. Although the appellate court decision discusses the validity
of all four claims, the Supreme Court only granted certiorari as to whether the search was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. at 1286. This section will
therefore only focus on the appellate court's decision that MUSC could test women without
warrants or probable cause.
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for drug use was reasonable under the special needs exception. 256
Specifically, the court found that the increase in positive drug tests
among MUSC's pregnant patients, as well as the public health issues
associated with maternal drug use, constituted a special need beyond
normal law enforcement goals.257  As such, MUSC's policy did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. 258
Following this determination, the appellate court applied the
reasonableness balancing test.259  Under that test, the court initially
found that the State had a legitimate interest in protecting unborn
children from the hazardous effects of prenatal drug use. 260 Second, the
court held that a urine screen is the only effective method of identifying
women who used drugs during their pregnancy, given the time
constraints of pregnancy and limited resources of a publicly funded
hospital. 261 Finally, the Fourth Circuit determined that the patients only
suffered a minimal invasion of privacy because the collection and
testing of urine is a normal part of a medical exam, 262 and MUSC
personnel did not arbitrarily administer the drug tests.263 Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit held that the government's interests outweighed the
patients' rights to privacy. 264
Judge Blake, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the urine tests qualified as a special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements. 265  From the
policy's inception, Judge Blake noted, the search was not conducted to
256. Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d at 479. Although the appellants argued that the district court
incorrectly allowed the jury to consider the issue of consent, the appellate court found it
unnecessary to consider this claim because the searches were reasonable under the special needs
doctrine. Id. The issue of consent was therefore irrelevant. Id.
257. Id. The Fourth Circuit also relied on the district court's finding that MUSC only
implemented the policy for medical purposes and did not conduct the drug tests to criminally
prosecute patients for drug use. See id. at 477.
258. Id. at 479.
259. Id. at 477-79. The Fourth Circuit balanced the government's interest in conducting the
search, the effectiveness of the search, and the level of intrusion of the search on the patient. Id.
Although these are not the same factors used in the Skinner line of cases, it appears that the
second factor, the effectiveness of the search, is similar to determining whether the underlying
purpose of the search would be limited by requiring a warrant. See id. at 478.
260. Id. at 477-78. The Court relied on studies that documented the health effect of maternal
drug abuse as well as the financial cost of treating drug-exposed infants. Id.
261. Id. at478.
262. Id. at 479; see also Yin v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that "[i]n
today's world, a medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would
be unusual").
263. See Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d at 479.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 484 (Blake, J., dissenting).
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serve a special need beyond normal law enforcement.26 6 She believed,
instead, that MUSC's initial and ultimate goal was to arrest and
prosecute pregnant drug users, either before or after they gave birth. 267
Unlike the Supreme Court's decisions in Skinner,268 Von Raab,269 and
Vernonia, 270 Judge Blake found that the consent forms did not advise
the patients that their results would be given to law enforcement
officials. 27' Finally, the positive drug tests were turned over to the
Charleston Police Department for prosecutorial purposes.
272
In addition, Judge Blake disagreed with the weight afforded to the
effectiveness of the urine tests when applying the balancing test.273
Although the alleged purpose of the drug screen was to diminish any
adverse effects that maternal drug use would have on the fetus, seven of
the plaintiffs were arrested after the child was born, not during
pregnancy when eliminating drug use would have a greater impact.274
Moreover, Judge Blake found that the degree of intrusion was very high
because positive results were given to police officers with no medical
reason for having access to the information. 275  Accordingly, Judge
Blake found that the search did not come within the special needs
exception and voted to reverse the district court's decision. 276
266. Id. at 487 (Blake, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 484 (Blake, J., dissenting). For example, Judge Blake relied on a letter that MUSC
General Counsel Joseph C. Good sent to Solicitor Condon prior to the policy's implementation:
I read with great interest in Saturday's newspaper accounts ... the Solicitor for the
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, prosecuting mothers who gave birth to children who tested
positive for drugs .... Please advise us if your office is anticipating future criminal
action and what if anything our Medical Center needs to do to assist you in this matter.
Id. (Blake, J., dissenting).
268. See supra notes 10 1-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Skinner decision).
269. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text (discussing the Von Raab decision).
270. See supra notes 130-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Vernonia decision).
271. Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d at 486 (Blake, J., dissenting); see also Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (finding that positive drug tests may not be used to
prosecute employees without consent).
272. See Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d at 484-86 (Blake, J., dissenting). Judge Blake argues that in
previous special needs cases, "arrest was at most an incidental possibility and not a direct result of
the warrantless Fourth Amendment intrusion sought to be justified." See id. at 487-88 (Blake, J.,
dissenting).
273. Id. at 488 (Blake, J., dissenting).
274. Id. (Blake, J., dissenting). Judge Blake reasoned that if the policy's real purpose was to
effectively prevent mothers from continuing to abuse drugs while pregnant, the hospital would
have taken more protective measures during earlier stages of pregnancy. Id. (Blake, J.,
dissenting).
275. Id. (Blake, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 484 (Blake, J., dissenting). Although beyond the scope of this Note, Judge Blake
also found that the policy was discriminatory toward African-American women and violated Title
VI. Id. at 489 (Blake, J., dissenting).
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Unhappy with the Fourth Circuit's decision, Ferguson and the nine
other women petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court
granted the writ on February 28, 2000.277 Approximately fourteen
months later, the Supreme Court decided whether MUSC's policy
violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches. 278
C. The Supreme Court Decision
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court decided
by a 6-3 margin to reverse the Fourth Circuit.279 The majority found
that MUSC's drug screens did not fall under the special needs exception
to the Fourth Amendment, and thus unfairly infringed upon a patient's
right to privacy. 280 Justice Kennedy's concurrence, however, left open
the possibility that adherence to strict Fourth Amendment procedures
would allow prosecution of pregnant drug abusers. 281 Moreover, Justice
Scalia's critical dissent argued that the government has a legitimate
interest in protecting the health of its citizens, as well as minimizing the
role of law enforcement in the development and implementation of
MUSC's policy. 28
2
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion held that MUSC's drug searches did not fall
under the special needs exception because law enforcement permeated
every aspect of MUSC's policy and the hospital excessively infringed
upon patient privacy. 283  Specifically, the Court reasoned that the
underlying goal of MUSC's policy is indistinguishable from normal law
enforcement purposes and thus can not qualify under the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment. 284 The Court also reasoned that
MUSC's policy of ordering urinalysis tests to obtain evidence of a
277. Ferguson It, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1287 (2001). Oral arguments were heard on October 4,
2000. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 1, Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001)
(No. 99-936).
278. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1287.
279. Id. at 1293.
280. Id. at 1288-93; see also infra notes 283-307 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority opinion).
281. Ferguson H, 121 S. Ct. at 1295; see also infra notes 308-22 and accompanying text
(discussing the concurring opinion).
282. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1296-1302; see also infra notes 323-48 and accompanying text
(discussing the dissenting opinion).
283. Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. at 1288-90, 1293. The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and
remanded the case to decide whether the patients had provided consent. Id. at 1293.
284. Id. at 1290 (citing Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447,458 (2000)).
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patient's drug use for law enforcement purposes violated the patient's
right to privacy and was an unreasonable search absent patient
consent.
285
The initial focus of the majority's opinion was MUSC's use of law
enforcement officials to develop and implement the policy.286 After
reiterating that urine tests qualified as searches under the Fourth
Amendment, 287 the majority initially distinguished this case from
previous special needs decisions that determined whether comparable
drug tests violated the Fourth Amendment. 288 According to the Court,
the essential difference was the "special need" asserted by the hospital
to justify its warrantless search.289 Unlike the present case, the
government's special need for a warrantless search in Skinner, Von
Raab, Vernonia, and Chandler did not involve any law enforcement
involvement or prosecutorial goals. 29° Conversely, a crucial component
of MUSC's policy was the threat of arrest and prosecution if a patient
did not comply with her drug treatment obligations. 291
After evaluating all available evidence, the majority identified four
examples where law enforcement initiatives overshadowed MUSC's
asserted goal of protecting the health of unborn children. 292  First, the
majority noted that the policy documented police measures that are only
associated with the preservation of criminal evidence. 293 Second, law
enforcement officials were intimately involved in administering each
285. Id. at 1292. For the purposes of analysis of the search under the special needs exception,
Justice Stevens assumed that the urine screens were conducted without the patient's informed
consent. Id. at 1287.
286. Id. at 1289-90.
287. Id. at 1287 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)).
Responding to the dissent's contention that taking a patient's urine sample was not a search, the
majority noted that the previous four special needs cases all considered urine screens taken by
government officials as searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1287 n.9.
288. Id. at 1288.
289. Id. at 1289.
290. Id. The Court noted that in its most recent special needs case, the Chief Justice argued
that "[t]he 'special needs' doctrine, which has been used to uphold certain suspicionless searches
performed for reasons unrelated to law enforcement, is an exception to the general rule that a
search must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." Id. at 1289 n.15 (citing
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447, 461 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
291. Id. at 1292. Although the majority acknowledged that maternal drug abuse was a serious
problem, the pervasiveness of law enforcement involvement negates the state's special need. Id.
at 1293.
292. Id. at 1290-91.
293. Id. at 1290. Examples included detailing a proper chain of custody, listing possible
criminal charges, how to notify police, and proper arrest procedures. Id.
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aspect of the policy. 294  Third, the majority found that the immediate
purpose of the drug screen was completely "indistinguishable from the
general interest in crime control. 295  Although it was possible that
MUSC was only utilizing the threat of arrest to insure that pregnant
women stopped abusing drugs, the policy's immediate effect was to
punish pregnant addicts. 296
Finally, the majority determined that releasing positive drug test
results directly to the police compels compliance with the Fourth
Amendment. 297  While the Court recognized that certain situations
require hospital employees to provide the police with evidence, this
exception only arises when the evidence is discovered during the course
of a routine examination.298  The Court determined, however, that
MUSC had a responsibility to inform patients of their constitutional
rights prior to obtaining informed consent because the testing occurred
"for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients." 299  Thus,
because of the widespread involvement of law enforcement officials,
294. Id. at 1290-91. Particularly noteworthy to the majority were the Solicitor and police
department's active involvement in coordinating arrests with hospital staff as well as determining
the drug screen protocol. See id.
295. Id. at 1290 (quoting Edmond, 121 S. Ct. at 458). The majority relied on Judge Blake's
dissent in the appellate court's decision: "[I]t ... is clear from the record that an initial and
continuing focus of the policy was on the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing mothers." Id.
(quoting Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d 469, 484 (4th Cir. 1999) (Blake, J., dissenting)). Despite the
respondents' assertion that protecting the health of unborn children was the policy's ultimate
goal, the majority made a clear distinction between this alleged goal and the policy's immediate
effect of prosecuting women. Id. at 1291.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1292.
298. Id. The majority argued that MUSC's policy was distinguishable from situations where
medical personnel, during the course of providing treatment, are legally or ethically obligated to
report information about the patient's condition or behavior. Id. at 1290 (citing COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, POLICYFINDER,
CURRENT OPINIONS E-5.05 (2000) (reporting is mandatory when "a patient threatens to inflict
serious bodily harm to another person or to him or herself if there is a reasonable probability that
the patient may carry out the threat")); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (West 2001)
(authorizing mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse and neglect); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-
12-602 (Michie 1999) (requiring physicians to report knife or gun shot wounds).
299. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1292. The Court noted that the dissent "mischaracterized our
opinion as holding that 'material which a person voluntarily entrusts to someone else cannot be
given by that person to the police and used for whatever evidence it may contain."' Id. at 1292
n.24 (quoting Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. at 1297 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The majority, however,
reiterated that it must assume that the patients did not authorize the hospital to give the test results
to the police. Id. at 1292. Because the search did not fall within the special needs exception, the
Court remanded the case to decide whether the patients consented, which will determine if the
search is unconstitutional. Id. at 1293.
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the majority concluded that the search did not qualify under the special
needs exception.300
Although applying the balancing test was unnecessary because the
search did not fall within the special needs exception, the Court also
held that the patients' privacy interests were substantially higher than in
previous special needs cases. 30 1 The Court noted that in the Skinner line
of cases, each individual knew why the drug test was given, who would
have access to the results, and the consequences of a positive test.30 2
Given that a patient reasonably expects test results to remain
confidential, the majority found that none of the previous special needs
cases rose to this level of intrusion. 30 3
Accordingly, the majority held that the searches were not excluded
from the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause
requirements. 304 The fundamental purpose of the policy was obtaining
evidence of criminal drug use that could be used in subsequent
prosecutions. 30 5 Although the respondents argued that their desire to
protect unborn children was a special need that justified the searches,
the majority determined that the policy's immediate purpose was to
promote law enforcement goals. 30 6  Under these circumstances, the
majority found that MUSC personnel cannot conduct warrantless
searches without individualized suspicion. 30 7
2. The Concurring Opinion
The concurrence, written by Justice Kennedy, also found that
MUSC's search procedure violated the Fourth Amendment. 30 8
However, he disagreed with the majority's distinction between the
"ultimate goal" of the policy and its "immediate purpose" when
analyzing whether the government had established a special need
300. Id. at 1292.
301. Id. at 1287; see also supra Part II.B (discussing the Court's development of the special
needs doctrine).
302. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1287. As such, the majority found that testing in those
situations involved a significantly less invasion than "the unauthorized dissemination of such
results to third parties." Id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al.
at 11, Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936); Brief of Amici Curiae American Public
Health Association et al. at 6, 17-19, Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
303. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1289.
304. Id. at 1292.
305. Id. at 1293.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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beyond normal law enforcement. 30 9  Citing the lack of precedent in
previous special needs cases to support this bifurcated approach, Justice
Kennedy argued that the special needs analysis is only based on the
government's "ultimate" need to conduct the search. 310 The immediate
purpose of any search is to collect evidence, thus making it impossible
to identify the particular special need which justifies the search. 311
Under a traditional special needs analysis, however, Justice Kennedy
still found that MUSC's ultimate goal of improving the health of
mothers and children was overshadowed by the substantial law
enforcement involvement in MUSC's policy. 312  Although the drug
testing program had legitimate objectives that were unrelated to law
enforcement, Justice Kennedy argued that successful special needs
searches never involve active police participation.313 The prosecutorial
component of the policy effectively turned the hospital into an agent of
law enforcement in order to successfully implement the policy. 314
Justice Kennedy, however, limited that conclusion's applicability to
MUSC's policy.315 He noted that the State had a legitimate interest in
protecting unborn children from the hazards of maternal drug abuse and
should have the ability to punish pregnant mothers abusing drugs.
316
309. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
310. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy argued that "[aill of our special needs
cases have turned upon what the majority terms the policy's ultimate goal," and not the
immediate effect or purpose of the drug testing policy. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Skinner,
for example, the Court focused on the FRA's ultimate goal of regulating employee conduct to
ensure railroad safety. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989). If the
Court had focused on the immediate purpose of the policy, the special need would be the
collection of evidence of employee drug and alcohol use. Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. at 1293
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
311. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1294 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
312. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
313. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy reiterated the majority's conclusion that
"as a systematic matter, law enforcement was a part of the implementation of the search policy in
each of its applications." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
314. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
315. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
316. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). In recognizing the State's interest, Justice Kennedy
acknowledged medical research which indicated the harmful effects that drug use can have on
viable fetuses. See, e.g., Robert Arendt et al., Motor Development of Cocaine-exposed Children
at Age Two Years, 103 PEDIATRICS 86, 90-91 (1999) (concluding that prenatal exposure to
cocaine caused delays in gross motor development); Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Prenatal Exposure to
Cocaine and Other Drugs: Outcome at Four to Six Years, 846 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCd. 314,
319-20 (J. Harvey & B. Kosofsky eds., 1998) (finding that drug-exposed babies experience
higher levels of depression, anxiety, and attention problems in childhood); Claudia A. Chiriboga
et al., Dose-Response Effect of Fetal Cocaine Exposure on Newborn Neurologic Function, 103
PEDIATRICS 79, 83-84 (1999) (finding that newborns exposed to prenatal drug use suffer greater
physical and mental abnormalities).
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Justice Kennedy supported hospitals adopting suitable testing criteria,
but reiterated that the policy cannot extend beyond rehabilitation and
treatment. 317  Prosecution is only an option if traditional warrant and
probable cause requirements are followed when obtaining the drug
samples.31
8
Finally, Justice Kennedy considered the majority's assumption that
the patients did not consent to the drug tests. 319 He believed that a
critical component of every special needs case was that the individual
consented to the search.32° Justice Kennedy argued that the majority, by
simply concluding that the patients did not consent to the tests, decided
the case under false pretenses. 321  Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy
concurred in the judgment, but concluded that the outcome might be
different if the majority made a different assumption. 322
3. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent, written by Justice Scalia, 323 found it unnecessary to
consider the applicability of the special needs exception because
collecting urine samples did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 324  However, even if the drug screens were a search,
Justice Scalia believed they fell under the special needs exception.
325
Justice Scalia opined that because law enforcement only played a
supplemental role in the policy's implementation and MUSC had a
317. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
318. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
319. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
320. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although the voluntariness of a special needs search is
always objectionable due to the adverse consequences that may result from refusal, consent has a
fundamental role in determining the reasonableness of the search. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (refusal would result in dismissal); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650-51 (refusal would deny athlete the opportunity to participate in after
school sports).
321. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
322. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
323. Id. at 1296 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Justice Scalia authored the dissent, Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas only joined the section regarding the application of the
special needs doctrine.
324. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia disagrees with the majority's conclusion that
urine tests taken by government officials are searches under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1296
n.l (Scalia, J., dissenting). He notes that unlike the present case, the urine samples in the
previous special needs cases were obtained involuntarily. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, in
his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy argues that the distinguishing aspect of the special needs
cases is that the individual actually provided consent. Id. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
325. Id. at 1299 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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special need to protect the health of unborn children, the drug tests were
constitutional.326
Justice Scalia initially concluded that testing the patient's urine was
not a search because the Fourth Amendment only protects against
searches of citizens' "persons, houses, papers, and effects." 327 First, he
stated that urine cannot be regarded as a person's effect, or part of one's
property, especially since it is "passed and abandoned.- 328  Second,
Justice Scalia argued that urine screens are not afforded Fourth
Amendment protection because the samples are given voluntarily. 329
To prove that urine samples are obtained without patient consent,
Justice Scalia maintained that the petitioners must prove (1) that
hospital officials coerced patients to give consent, (2) that patients were
not told that their urine would be screened for drugs, or (3) that consent
was uninformed because the patients did not know that positive results
would be turned over to the police. 330
As for the last two methods of proof, Justice Scalia opined that it is
not unconstitutional to use "lawfully (but deceivingly) obtained material
for purposes other than those represented," and then give any
information derived from the search to the police.331  Despite the
deceitful nature of the transaction, the patient still consented to the
initial search and cannot rely on the Fourth Amendment for
protection. 332 Justice Scalia also found it extremely unlikely that the
hospitals coerced patients into giving urine samples under the guise of
receiving medical treatment. 333 Additionally, he stated that if the
patient felt coerced, it was due to her own beliefs, not as a result of
pressure applied by the government via hospital personnel.334
Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that giving consent precluded the
326. Id. at 1299-1302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 1296 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV; supra note 9 and
accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Amendment).
328. Ferguson H, 121 S. Ct. at 1296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
329. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 1296-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 1297 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). In Hoffa
v. United States, the Court held that "the Fourth Amendment [does not protect] a wrongdoer's
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."
Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302. The dissent argued that any information obtained through a breach of
trust, including a positive urine screen, is still obtained consensually and therefore not a search
under the Fourth Amendment. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1297 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
332. Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. at 1296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 1299 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
334. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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patients from claiming the hospital unlawfully obtained their urine
samples.335
Assuming the special needs doctrine was applicable, however, Justice
Scalia would still find the search constitutional.336 First, he objected to
the majority's determination that protecting the health of pregnant
women and their unborn children is simply a "pretext" for hiding the
law enforcement purposes of the search.33 7 Justice Scalia supported the
medically-related goal of the policy by noting that MUSC began the
drug testing program on its own volition, without the instruction or
involvement of law enforcement officials. 338 Because the program was
designed to promote maternal and infant health care in both the short
and long term,339 Justice Scalia questioned why the additional presence
of law enforcement would change the policy's goal from improving
health to incriminating pregnant women who used drugs. 340  Moreover,
he noted that police involvement only began after the testing had been
conducted for reasons independent of prosecution. 341
Justice Scalia then criticized the majority for assuming that the
"addition" of a law-enforcement related purpose to a legitimate health-
related purpose prevents the applicability of the special needs
exception. 342  Here, the physicians only "searched" patients suspected
335. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
336. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Justice
Scalia in this part of his dissent. In order to apply the special needs exception, however, Justice
Scalia argued that he would be forced to assume that the patients did not consent to the drug tests
nor understand that the results would be given to the police. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). He would
also have to assume, contrary to "common sense," that testing the urine constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
337. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 1300 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also pointed to the district court's
finding that the policy's goal was "not to arrest patients but to facilitate their treatment and
protect both the mother and the unborn child." Id. at 1299 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Rule 52(a), Justice Scalia argued that the lower court's finding
is binding unless clearly erroneous, which in his opinion, it is not. Id. at 1299-1300; see also
FED. R. Ctv. P. 52(a).
339. Ferguson H, 121 S. Ct. at 1300 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
340. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 1302 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that while prosecution may have
been threatened at an earlier stage, i.e. in the Solicitor's letters, actual law enforcement
involvement did not occur until after test was positive. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, it
would be impractical to not have some police involvement at earlier stages of testing, specifically
regarding preservation of evidence. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
342. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The special needs exception was initially developed to allow
certain searches by law enforcement officials, who would normally only have a prosecutorial
objective. See id. at 1300 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As precedent, Justice Scalia relied on Griffin v.
Wisconsin where the Court found that the State's special need to ensure compliance with
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of prenatal drug abuse in order to protect the health of the mother and
the child.343 The fact that the physicians also preserved the evidence for
law enforcement purposes did not change the underlying medical
purpose of the policy. 344  Justice Scalia argued, therefore, that the
majority's conclusion that law enforcement was involved in every
aspect of the policy is misguided.345
Ultimately, Justice Scalia revealed his belief that the policy's initial
goal of protecting mothers and their children qualified as a special need
beyond normal law enforcement purposes. 346  Although the hospital
gave positive tests to the police, Justice Scalia accepted that the policy
only intended to provide addicted patients with a strong incentive to
enter drug rehabilitation programs. 347  Justice Scalia therefore
concluded that the searches were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment and were not required to adhere to the traditional warrant
and probable cause requirements. 348
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority correctly held that testing pregnant mothers at a public
hospital, and then giving positive test results to law enforcement
officials without the patient's consent, violated their Fourth Amendment
rights against unreasonable searches. 34 9 This section first demonstrates
why the all-encompassing involvement of law enforcement in the
development and implementation of the MUSC policy prohibits
probation requirements justified a warrantless search of the probationer's house. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987).
343. Ferguson H, 121 S. Ct. at 1301 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
344. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
345. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
346. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 1300 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Only thirty out of 253 patients that tested positive for
drug use were arrested, leading the dissent to conclude that the police only used the results for the
"benign" purpose of enticing addicted mothers to receive treatment. Id. at 1302 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
348. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did not find it necessary to apply the balancing
test to determine if the search was reasonable. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, he did note
that the patients had a lower expectation of privacy because the tests were conducted as part of a
routine medical examination. Id. at 1301 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, patients are aware
that South Carolina requires physicians to break confidentiality if necessitated by public policy.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
349. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the majority's holding and reasoning for determining
that the searches violated the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment).
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utilizing the special needs exception. 350  The analysis then turns to the
disturbing possibility that Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion left
room for future prosecution of women who abuse drugs during
pregnancy.351 Finally, this section discusses the dissenting opinion's
mistaken argument that law enforcement officials were only involved
after a patient tested positive for drug use.
352
A. Pervasive Law Enforcement Involvement Precludes the Application
of the Special Needs Exception
The majority correctly found that the special needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to a policy that is intimately linked
to law enforcement goals.353 Although previous special needs cases
were different from the Ferguson decision in a variety of respects, 354 the
primary distinction is the lack of interrelation between social policy and
prosecutorial concerns. 355  In previous cases, the government's special
need to reduce drug use among student athletes or to reduce fatal
railroad accidents was clearly divorced from any general law
enforcement goal.356 For example, while positive drug tests may have
resulted in dismissal from school or loss of employment, the drug
testing policies clearly stated that the results would not be turned over to
the police. 357  Moreover, the administrators informed the individuals
350. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the involvement of law enforcement officials in every
aspect of MUSC's policy).
351. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the issues left open as noted in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence); Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct. at 1294-95 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
352. See supra Part IV.C (discussing why the dissenting opinion incorrectly concluded that
the drug screens were reasonable); Ferguson IH, 121 S. Ct. at 1301 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia argued that doctors are "supposed to have in mind the welfare of the [mother and child].
That they have in mind in addition the provision of evidence to the police should make no
difference." Ferguson 1H, 121 S. Ct at 1301 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
353. Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct at 1290.
354. See supra notes 101-60 and accompanying text (discussing the Skinner, Von Raab,
Vernonia, and Chandler decisions).
355. See supra Part III.C.l (discussing the majority opinion); Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. at 1292
n.20. The majority argued that despite the appearance of a medical purpose, MUSC's policy was
completely predicated on the goals of law enforcement officials. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1291.
According to the Court, "[w]hat matters is that under the new policy developed by the solicitor's
office and MUSC, law enforcement involvement was the means by which [the] therapeutic
purpose was to be met." Id.; see also Buffaloe, supra note 41, at 531 (noting that while the
special needs exception is applicable to numerous situations, all special needs cases are "linked
by virtue of the fact that in each case the government actor is someone other than a police officer
searching for evidence to support a criminal prosecution").
356. Ferguson II, 121 S. Ct. at 1290 n.15.
357. Id. at 1288.
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submitting urine samples that the results could not be used for criminal
prosecution. 35
8
The Ferguson majority recognized the pretextual nature of MUSC's
purported goal of protecting mothers and their children from the hazards
of drug abuse. 359 Though the Court may have reached a different result
if the true objective of the policy had been health-related, the pervasive
police involvement made the needs of women secondary to that of law
enforcement objectives. 360 Simply put, MUSC's special need to prevent
prenatal drug abuse does not elevate the policy beyond its law
enforcement goals. 36
1
Specifically, MUSC's policy was crafted with law enforcement input
from the very beginning. 362 First, the policy's implementation took
place four months prior to drug treatment and rehabilitation measures
being added to the program. 363 Second, despite the purported goal of
insuring fetal protection, MUSC's policy did not provide for future
medical treatment for the newborn child.364  Finally, the policy
primarily threatened arrest in order to deter women from using drugs
during pregnancy, not to encourage women to obtain prenatal care to
protect their unborn children. 365 In these ways, MUSC's policy failed
to accomplish its principle goal and instead subjected the mother and
her child to greater health risks because addicted patients feared arrest
upon their attempts to receive prenatal care. 366
B. The Possibility of Future Prosecution for Prenatal Drug Abuse
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy opened the door to future
legislation that provides for fetal abuse prosecution. Justice Kennedy
358. Id. at 1288 n.12. All previous special needs cases employed protections against releasing
information to third parties. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 312, 318 (1997); Vernonia
Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 621 n.5 (1989); Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 663, 666-67 (1989).
359. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the majority opinion); see also supra notes 265-76
(discussing Judge Blake's dissent).
360. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the majority opinion).
361. Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct. at 1293.
362. See supra Part II.D (discussing the development and implementation of MUSC's policy).
363. See supra notes 203-26 (discussing the differences between the 1989 and 1990 versions
of MUSC's policy).
364. Ferguson 1I, 121 S. Ct. at 1285.
365. Ferguson 1, 186 F.3d 469, 488 (Blake, J., dissenting), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001). The
policy was not a deterrent to prenatal drug use as the majority of the women were arrested after
giving birth. Id. (Blake, J. dissenting). Judge Blake argued that "[b]y that time, any adverse
effect of maternal cocaine use on the developing fetus had already occurred, and the arrest could
only have had a punitive rather than preventive purpose." Id. (Blake, J., dissenting).
366. Akhter, supra note 194, at 1; see also Paltrow, supra note 181, at 1028-29.
2001]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
initially agreed that the MUSC searches did not fall within the special
needs exception to the Fourth Amendment. 67  Reiterating the
majority's concerns, he noted that previous special needs cases never
involved active law enforcement participation in the development or
implementation of the drug-testing program. 368
Justice Kennedy, however, made it very clear that South Carolina had
a legitimate interest in protecting the health of mothers and unborn
children from prenatal drug abuse. 369 In order to further that interest,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence provided a blueprint that would allow
state officials to draft legislation criminalizing a woman's behavior
during pregnancy. 370 As such, South Carolina and the remaining forty-
nine states could impose punishment on pregnant drug addicts as long
as the legislation provided traditional Fourth Amendment protections. 37'
Instead of recognizing that drug addiction is a medical disease, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the women who place their child at risk for
prenatal exposure deserve punishment for their action, especially given
that the fetus is an innocent victim.372
C. MUSC's Policy Does Not Distinguish Between Medical Treatment
and Law Enforcement Goals
Despite evidence to the contrary, the dissenting opinion incorrectly
minimized the role of law enforcement in MUSC's policy by noting that
the police only became involved after a woman tested positive for drug
use. 373  In fact, the dissent's attempt to divorce the law enforcement
component of MUSC's policy is contrary to the text of the policy
itself.374  It is impossible to ignore the prominent role that law
enforcement played in every aspect of the policy, even though the stated
367. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the concurring opinion); Ferguson I1, 121 S. Ct. at
1293 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
368. Ferguson H, 121 S. Ct. at 1294 (Kennedy J., concurring); see also supra note 313 and
accompanying text (discussing how special needs searches should not involve law enforcement).
369. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1294-95 (Kennedy J., concurring); see also supra notes 316-18
and accompanying text (discussing South Carolina's interest in protecting unborn children from
prenatal drug exposure).
370. Ferguson H, 121 S. Ct. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although Justice Kennedy
struck down MUSC's policy in its current form, he left open the possibility that prosecution is an
option if constitutional procedures are followed: "If prosecuting authorities ... adopt legitimate
procedures to discover this information and prosecution follows, that ought not to invalidate the
testing." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
371. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
372. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
373. Id. at 1302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
374. See supra notes 292-300 and accompanying text (discussing the involvement of law
enforcement in implementing MUSC's policy).
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goal of the policy may have been to facilitate the treatment of drug
addicted mothers and their children. 375 Contrary to the dissenting
opinion, MUSC clearly predicated the implementation and effectiveness
of its policy on medical personnel and law enforcement officials
cooperating to identify and prosecute pregnant drug users. 376 Because
of this cooperation, the search did not fall within the special needs
exception and is therefore unconstitutional.
V. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's ruling in Ferguson is a victory for pregnant
women and health care professionals. The Court achieved the stated
goal of MUSC's policy by insuring that pregnant drug abusers will
continue to receive prenatal and postnatal care. 377 The Court, however,
left two unanswered questions because of the limited nature of this
decision. 378  First, the decision leaves open the possibility that a
pregnant woman could be prosecuted for legal activities that negatively
impact her unborn child.379  Second, the decision fails to clarify what
constitutes a "special need" for the purposes of qualifying for this
exception to the Fourth Amendment's traditional requirements. 38
0
A. Insuring that Pregnant Drug Users Will Obtain Prenatal Care
Although the Court struck down the MUSC policy as a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, 381 its decision actually achieved the policy's
goal of protecting the health of mothers and their unborn children.
First, research has shown that when women think obtaining prenatal
care results in criminal prosecution, they are reluctant to seek
-375. See supra notes 292-300 and accompanying text (discussing the involvement of law
enforcement in implementing MUSC's policy). For example, police officers developed the
policy's operational guideline for preserving evidence, notification of positive drug tests, and
arrest procedures. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1290. They also had access to confidential hospital
records regarding positive tests and received copies of patients' progress reports. Id. at 1291.
376. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1291.
377. See infra Part V.A (discussing the positive implications resulting from the Ferguson
decision).
378. See infra Part V.B-C (discussing the uncertainty that remains following the Ferguson
decision).
379. See infra Part V.B (examining the breadth of possibilities that may trigger fetal abuse
prosecutions under the reasoning of the concurrence).
380. See infra Part V.C (discussing the questions that still remain in special needs
jurisprudence).
381. Ferguson H, 121 S. Ct. at 1293. If MUSC's policy actually reduced the number of drug-
exposed children, there should have been an increase in the -number of drug-exposed children
after the policy was terminated. Brief for Petitioners at 17, Ferguson H, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001)
(No. 99-936). This increase did not occur. Id.
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treatment. 382  Fortunately, the Ferguson decision will allow pregnant
drug users to obtain needed prenatal care because hospitals must
implement safeguards to protect their privacy. Specifically, hospital
personnel must obtain their patients' informed consent if positive drug
test results will be given to law enforcement officials.38 3  More
importantly, health care providers will recognize that their primary
responsibility is to treat pregnant drug abusers with medical care and
treatment, not with punitive responses such as criminal prosecution.384
Second, the Ferguson decision reassures pregnant women that they
have an equal right to a confidential relationship with their
physicians. 385 Because they are no longer forced to act as an extension
of law enforcement agencies, health care providers can now focus on
providing quality medical care in a confidential environment. 386
Because this guarantee of confidentiality will encourage pregnant
women to be completely honest with their physicians, both the mother
and the unborn child will continue to receive the best medical care
possible. 387  The MUSC policy, however, did not promote either of
these goals and was fortunately declared unconstitutional by the
Court.388
382. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text (discussing why the threat of arrest deters
women from seeking prenatal care). More importantly, MUSC's own research concluded that the
policy deterred pregnant women from seeking prenatal care at the hospital. Paul-Emile, supra
note 2, at 372.
383. Ferguson 1H, 121 S. Ct. at 1292. This decision has been applauded by several pro-choice
organizations who argued that consent is a critical component of insuring women obtain prenatal
care. For example, CARAL believed that "treating women like second-class citizens by testing
them without their knowledge ... serv[ed] to deter women from seeking needed medical care."
CARAL, A Pro-Choice Victory in the U.S. Supreme Court, at http://www.caral.org/
alert.ferguson.html (last modified Mar. 30, 2001).
384. See Brief of Amici Curiae The Rutherford Institute at 9, Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. 1281
(2001) (No. 99-936). In view of the multiple obligations that physicians have to their patients,
"counseling patients against drug use is recommended as a standard intervention." Id. This view
is supported by the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Family Physicians,
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the U.S. Preventative Systems
Task Force. Id.
385. Associated Press, Court: Consent Needed to Drug-Test Pregnant Women (Mar. 21,
2000), at http://www.cnn.com/200/LAW/O3/21/scotus.drug.test.03/index.html. Priscilla Smith,
one of the attorneys who represented the petitioners, proclaimed that "[ilt reaffirms that pregnant
women have that same right to a confidential relationship with their doctors." Id.
386. See also Akhter, supra note 194, at 1.
387. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al. at 11, Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct.
1281 (2001) (No. 99-936). The American Medical Association states that "meaningful medical
care depends on a successful physician/patient relationship." Id.
388. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. at 1293.
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B. Prosecuting Pregnant Women for Using Alcohol, Caffeine, or
Tobacco Use?
Despite the triumph for pregnant women in Ferguson, questions
remain. The Court's holding in Ferguson requires health care providers
to obtain informed consent before giving positive drug tests to law
enforcement officials. 389  Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion,
however, left open the possibility that MUSC's policy could be
constitutional if traditional warrant and probable cause requirements are
followed.390 As such, women could be prosecuted if the searches were
conducted in compliance with the Fourth Amendment.391 Although
South Carolina is the only state that applies child abuse laws to viable
fetuses, it is possible that other states may soon consider the possibility
of proposing similar legislation.
392
A more disturbing trend is the possible expansion of prosecutions
beyond women who abuse drugs during pregnancy. 393  If protecting
fetal health is considered a legitimate state interest, law enforcement
officials could eventually test pregnant women to determine if they are
maintaining a healthy diet and exercising regularly. 394 Positive tests for
alcohol, caffeine, or tobacco, all of which have been shown to harm
fetal development, could eventually lead to arrest and prosecution for
child abuse or neglect.395  Even if the substances are legal, it appears
that these searches would be upheld if they conformed to the Fourth
Amendment's safeguards.
389. Id. at 1292.
390. Id. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 315-18 and accompanying
text (discussing the possibility of upholding MUSC's policy if it conformed to Fourth
Amendment safeguards). Justice Kennedy argued that "[t]here should be no doubt that South
Carolina can impose punishment upon an expectant mother who has so little regard for her own
unborn that she risks causing him or her lifelong damage and suffering." Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct.
at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
391. Ferguson H1, 121 S. Ct. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 315-18
and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of upholding MUSC's policy if it conformed to
Fourth Amendment safeguards).
392. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1995), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998); see
also supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing the decision to criminalize prenatal
drug abuse).
393. Ellen Goodman, Cause To Be Wary of Justice Kennedy's Warning, STATE-JOURNAL
REGISTER (Springfield), Mar. 26, 2001, available at http://www.sj-r.com.
394. Id.
395. Wilkins, supra note 228, at 1427-28 (arguing that "[b]ecause the link between drinking
alcohol and fetal harm is so strong, states may be able to regulate the alcohol intake of pregnant
women.") For additional research demonstrating the effects of tobacco on prenatal development,
see Barry Zuckerman, Marijuana and Cigarette Smoking During Pregnancy: Neonatal Effects, in
DRUGS, ALCOHOL, PREGNANCY AND PARENTING 73 (Ira J. Chasnoff ed., 1988); see also AMA
Report, supra note 197, at 2666.
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C. Application of the Special Needs Exception Remains Uncertain
Finally, the Court failed to clarify the confusion surrounding what
constitutes a "special need" for the purposes of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. 396 The Ferguson majority reaffirmed its commitment to
use a context-specific analysis to determine whether government
officials have demonstrated a special need to conduct a warrantless
search.3 97 This analysis, however, leaves lower courts without clear
guidelines to follow. 398 Different rulings on the same issue will
naturally result because each court will conduct its own inquiry based
on its perception of the government's interest.399
In addition, legislatures will lack the confidence to develop
legislation to serve a legitimate special need for fear that it will be found
unconstitutional. While this indecision may force government officials
to act with greater caution when formulating policies that involve the
Fourth Amendment, there are still situations where it is impractical to
obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search. 4°° As a result, legal
challenges to warrantless searches will grow unless the Supreme Court
clearly defines what constitutes a special need and further clarifies the
weight afforded to each side of the reasonableness balancing test.40 1
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority correctly decided that MUSC's policy of testing
pregnant women for evidence of drug use without a warrant or patient
consent violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches. While the majority's opinion left important
questions unanswered, it correctly chose a patient's right to confidential
medical treatment over MUSC's alleged goal of protecting the health of
pregnant women and their unborn children. Although MUSC had an
396. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of clear standards for
applying the special needs doctrine).
397. Ferguson 11, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1290 (2001). The Court relied on its reasoning in
Chandler to "carry out a 'close review' of the scheme at issue before concluding that the need in
question was not special." Id.; see also supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text (discussing
the Chandler decision).
398. Smiley, supra note 58, at 825-26. Smiley notes that "[t]he contradictory outcomes
reached ... illustrate the practical impossibility of applying the doctrine in a consistent manner."
Id.
399. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of clear standards for
applying the special needs doctrine).
400. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
401. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of clear standards for
applying the special needs doctrine); see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing
the special needs balancing test).
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opportunity to develop a policy that would achieve this goal, the
pervasive use of law enforcement created a situation where the privacy
rights of patients were unconstitutionally infringed. As such, the
Ferguson decision affirms that the special needs exception may only be
applied when the government's interest in conducting the search is
divorced from any law enforcement purpose. Moreover, it solidifies the
confidential relationship between physicians and their patients and
insures that pregnant drug abusers will continue to receive prenatal care
without fear of prosecution.
